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1Introduction
Space science, like nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become
a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence
can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war.
— President John F. Kennedy
Address to Rice University1
President Kennedy had just finished touring the new Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston, Texas when he
spoke these words. In his speech he addressed a broad vision for the future of the United States and the world
in space. Kennedy perceived and understood the great potential that space has to offer for all mankind. He
hoped and believed that space would be used to promote progress and peace for all the people of the world, but
he also understood that there were risks and dangers that could not be ignored. His next words in Houston that
day were perhaps even more enlightening as to his vision and priorities. He said,
I do not say that we should or will go unprotected against the hostile misuse of space any more than we go
unprotected against the hostile use of land or sea, but I do say that space can be explored and mastered
without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ
around this globe of ours.2
President Kennedy understood the delicate balance between peace and war. He had a clear vision of the
future of the United States in space. He understood that this country could not go undefended into this new
frontier. He believed that only through strength could the United States ensure such a future.
Today, thirty-six years later, the United States is proceeding into the frontier of space in ways that not even
President Kennedy had foreseen. Our civil space program has made manned travel to space almost routine, and
our Russian partners have launched the first elements of an international space station. The U.S. military has
become absolutely dependent on the use of space systems for conducting all military operations—from
peacekeeping to major theater wars. And perhaps even more impressively, U.S. and international business
interests are moving into space in record numbers. By the turn of the century, the commercial space industry is
expected to generate more than $122 billion in revenue in the United States alone.3
The United States is, however, in spite of the warnings of President Kennedy and many others, proceeding
“unprotected” into the future. Should any adversary on any level—national, commercial, or even
individual—decide to interfere with our space systems, the United States has no coherent policy or means to
deal with such a threat.
Opponents of an expanded military space program (beyond the current capability to support terrestrial
forces) charge that, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, there no longer exists any
threat of the hostile misuse of space. They argue that space has indeed become the “sea of peace” that President
Kennedy dreamed of, where space is being mastered and explored without threat of warfare or conflict.
In fact, in spite of indications to the contrary, this study will demonstrate that conflict in space is
inevitable—and on a limited basis, has already occurred. Nations have already interfered with the space systems
of other nations—through jamming and interference—solely for commercial advantage. All the nations of the
world have learned from the Persian Gulf War how critically dependent the United States is on the use of space
assets to successfully operate in a theater of war. No nation would dare to challenge the United States in
conventional military operations without attempting to level the information dominant battlefield that the
United States currently enjoys; and this dominance, in great part, comes from space.
Using historical precedent and current indicators, this study will demonstrate why conflict in space cannot
be avoided. It will then address methods and means for dealing with such a conflict. It should be noted at this
point, however, that these methods and means do not necessarily demand the deployment of space weapons.
2 Introduction
The topic of weapons in space has long been controversial and difficult to define. Space weapons, for the
purposes of this study, will be defined as follows:
Space Weapon: (1) a weapon (ground-based or space-based) that can attack and negate the capability of
space systems on orbit or (2) a weapon based in space that can attack targets on the earth.
Many aspects of conflict, however, certainly in the near term, can be assuaged without space
weapons—without military intervention in space. But to do so would require the aggressive implementation of
other instruments of national power, specifically economic and political. This has not happened. Even though
the future of the United States in space is being debated within limited political and military circles, it is not
being addressed in any real depth on a national level.
In the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of an active Soviet space threat, the debate was loud, vigorous, and
involved not only leading military officers, presidents, and congressmen, but many from the scientific and
academic community as well. Significantly, it was also extremely well covered by the mainstream national
media. The debate today lacks this national attention and committed involvement as evidenced by the lack of
response to a major speech given at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy in November of 1998 by Senator Bob
Smith, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In this
speech, he proposed, in very strong terms, the need for space weapons and perhaps even the need for a separate
space force to develop and operate these weapons. Media response to these radical and bold proposals was
almost non-existent. For many weeks, the only media coverage to be found was in primarily defense-related
periodicals such as Inside the Air Force.4 The first mainstream U.S. newspaper to even mention this speech
was the Washington Times  when it published an editorial by James Hackett on 11 January 1999 (nearly two
months after the speech).5
But at least the debate is beginning. Unfortunately, the discourse thus far seems to be focused on two very
strong, opposing positions: the need for space weapons versus the need to maintain space as a sanctuary. This
study will describe both these positions, but these positions will not be the focus. This is not solely about the
debate for weapons in space. It is about choices—choices that will help define the future of this nation, and the
world, in space.
General Richard B. Myers, Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command (CINCSPACE),
said in a speech in early 1999, “Just as we can’t expect to successfully fight the next war with the equipment of
the last war, we surely won’t see victory in the next war using the policies of the last war. To best prepare for
the future, we have to energize our thinking, too. We need that national debate on the existing policies and
open questions affecting future military capabilities and possibilities in space and we need resolution of that
debate sooner rather than later.”6
This study will begin to provide some of the information necessary to resolve that debate. It is divided
into two parts. Part I, the first five chapters, will answer the question, “Is Conflict in Space Inevitable?”
Chapter one will begin by defining and discussing the broad concepts of conflict and war, and how this relates
to the problem of space. The role of technology, the military, and the economy in generating conflict will be
explained. In chapter two, the historical position of the United States in the world today, as the lone
superpower, will be given contextual relevance and compared with other nations in history that have found
themselves in a similar role as a dominant power. The role of the frontier, the control of the frontier, and how it
has been critical to the shaping of nations is a key concept, and historical analysis can provide invaluable
insight into future conflict involving space. Chapters three and four will discuss the current pressures on space,
both economic and military. These pressures will be analyzed from a number of different perspectives and are
extremely relevant in exploring the potential for future conflict. Chapter five will pull together the various
aspects of the discussion. The general nature of future conflict in space will become clear along with an
appreciation of the inevitability of such conflict.
Part II will then discuss how to deal with future conflict in space. By evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of the current U.S. political, military, and economic strategies, the study will develop specific
recommendations for new strategies and courses of action. Chapter six will discuss the potential for the military
instrument of national power to deal with conflict in space. The different military missions will be defined with
particular emphasis placed on the mission of space control. Specific military plans, from the United State Space
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Command, the U.S. Air Force, and the Department of Defense, will be presented. Chapter seven will present
criticisms of these plans. The views of critics from the political, scientific, academic, and military communities
will be thoroughly discussed. Chapter eight will explore the use of other instruments of national power with an
emphasis on the political and economic possibilities. The possibilities for diplomatic solutions to future
conflict in space will be put forth as well as a discussion of current U.S. and international initiatives. The
possibilities for commercial space opportunities to effectively influence this conflict will also be described. The
latter half of this chapter will present the views of the numerous critics of current political and economic space
policy and initiatives. Chapter nine will summarize the paper by providing an overall context for dealing with
future conflict in space. It will then conclude by providing nine specific recommendations for the
future—recommendations that would allow an improved framework for dealing with the inevitable conflict.
Both before and after his 1962 speech in Houston, President Kennedy directed very specific and consistent
actions to implement a space program that aggressively and effectively mixed all the instruments of national
power—economic, political, and military. His purpose was to preserve the U.S. ability to protect its national
interests while simultaneously preserving the ability of the world to peacefully explore and take full advantage
of space. The Apollo program was the most visible effort he pushed, but he also pursued the development and
deployment of military space systems including the deployment of space weapons. At the same time, he
aggressively pursued with the Soviet Union (then the only other space threat) a verifiable international
treaty—eventually resulting in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967—that would help eliminate the dangers of
weapons of mass destruction in space. Kennedy fully grasped that the development of credible military options
was essential in creating the environment for successful arms control negotiations, and that both weapons and
diplomacy had to be pursued aggressively.
Today, however, in looking at the future of the United States in space, there does not appear to be any
similar coherent national strategy. On a national level, despite the efforts of many military and political leaders,
there is little understanding of the value and importance that space plays in the future of this nation. It is
essential that the United States develop a vision for this nation’s future in space, and such a vision must
include our civil, commercial, and military space programs. The United States, even in the relative peace of
today, cannot afford to go into the next century “unprotected against the hostile misuse of space.”
Notes
1. John F. Kennedy, The Burden and the Glory (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 243.
2. Ibid.
3. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, 25–26.
4. In addition to a survey of major newspapers, magazines, and the INTERNET performed during the course of
this research, the Air Force Space Command Office of the Legislative Liaison, HQ AFSPC/XPPL, Peterson AFB, CO,
performs an ongoing, detailed search for anything of interest to military space. They publish these articles every week
in their Legislative Update. Their survey found no media response by the mainstream press either.
5. James Hackett, “Space Control Horizon,” Washington Times, opinion editorial, 11 January 1999.
6. General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Commander in Chief, United States Space Command, Address to the United
States Air Force Warfighting Symposium, Orlando, FL, 4 February 1999.
Part I
Is Conflict in Space Inevitable?
7Chapter 1
Conflict
Conflict—n. 1. A battle or struggle, esp. a prolonged struggle; strife 2. Controversy; a quarrel
War—n. 1. A conflict carried on by force of arms, as between nations or between parties within a nation;
warfare, as by land, sea, or air
Webster’s Dictionary1
Conflict can mean many things to many people—and the line between international conflict and war is often
just as confusing. Therefore, it is essential to clarify these critical terms. The dictionary is a good place to start.
The definitions above provide an excellent framework for discussion for a couple of reasons. First, in the
definition of war, space is not explicitly included. To this date, warfare has not taken place by space as it indeed
has by land, sea, and air. Space has become a critical medium to facilitate the conduct of warfare by land, sea,
and air, but has not itself been the actual medium in which warfare has been conducted. Secondly, the
definition of war makes it very clear that war is simply a means (albeit a violent one) for dealing with conflict.
The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, is perhaps most remembered for his edict that “war is
a mere continuation of policy by other means.”2 He theorized and believed that war was another step for a
nation’s leadership to consider when attempting to resolve conflict. This theory of war has been proven correct a
number of times, and it is interesting to note, in looking at the dictionary, that Clausewitz’ edict has
essentially defined the term “war” helping to further solidify war as an understood means for dealing with
conflict.
A critical element of Clausewitz’ logic and theory that has evolved over the years, particularly in U.S.
society, is that war is not only another option for resolving conflict, it should also be the final option. In other
words, a rational leader should have exhausted all other, more peaceful, methods for resolving a particular
conflict before committing the blood and treasure of his or her nation to the act of war. This seems to very
much apply to the U.S. political system. The checks and balances inherent in our democratic system currently
tend to force U.S. leaders, on most occasions, to consider the application of military force only as a last resort.3
Clausewitz, however, clearly focused his arguments and analysis “on war.” Other methods for dealing with
conflict were not fully addressed. It is essential in discussing the future of space, on the other hand, to address
all means for dealing with conflict in space, not just warfare. Pursuing further the logic of U.S. policy in the
previous paragraph, the United States should not pursue war in space unless all other options for resolving a
conflict have been attempted. The implications of this statement are far reaching, and will become clearer as the
details of the anticipated conflict in space are explored.
Over 1100 companies in 53 different countries are currently exploiting space, and many of these have just
begun to take advantage of space in the last decade.4 In the last few years, space has progressed from a place
that was the purview of only a few wealthy nations to one of the most international of resources. It is therefore
logical to assume that any conflict in space, even among rival corporations, would most likely have to be
resolved on an international level—among nations.
Many libraries are filled with volumes of academic debate describing the numerous theories as to the causes
of conflicts and wars among nations. It is difficult to accurately define the beginning of the debate, but perhaps
the best place to start is with the Greek historian Thucydides who, in his treatise The Peloponnesian War,
documented the twenty-eight years of war between Athens and Sparta during the fifth century B.C. Thucydides
introduced two basic, yet critical theories for understanding conflict among nations. First he determined that
there were two types of factors that could be described as causes of war—underlying causes and immediate
causes. The underlying cause was defined as the real cause of the conflict and was often a “relational discord”
that had existed for an extended period of time.5 The immediate cause was simply the match that ignited the
actual hostilities—the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.”
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Thucydides’ second critical theory resulted from his simple and straightforward description of the cause of
the Peloponnesian War. He revealed, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear
that this caused in Sparta (that is the underlying cause of the war).” The true cause of the war was a change in
the balance of power in the Mediterranean and the absolute fear that this created among the Spartans.6 Changes
in the balance of power among nations—or perceived changes—have been critical elements in generating
conflict throughout history and remain so today.
Although conflict and war have changed significantly since the Peloponnesian War, the basic principles
have remained valid. These principles, all of which help influence the balance of power, can be identified by
three general categories: (1) wealth and territory, (2) the size and nature of armies, and (3) weapons technology
(and the tactics for employing the technology).
Wealth and territory have historically defined a nation’s strength in a number of ways. Both create a visible
perception of power in the eyes of the world. A wealthy nation can invest in the development of agriculture,
industry, education, transportation, communication, and many other aspects of society that allow its citizenry
to prosper. Wealth also allows increased investment in security and military power often necessary to allow a
nation to both protect itself and expand into new territories and markets. Territory and wealth have often gone
hand in hand. A nation that could expand its territory, its area of influence, could reap the benefits of new
resources, a larger work force, while at the same time creating an additional barrier of protection for the nation’s
core. Growth in wealth and territory can often change the perception of the balance of power among nations and
thus help create conflict.
Armies, the military power of nations, directly influence the balance of power among nations. An army (or
any military force) that grows in power can threaten neighbors even without specific threats to or from those
neighbors. Over the centuries, the very nature of armies has changed significantly—from hired armies led by
nobility, to professional armies, to revolutionary armies, to draft armies, to volunteer armies. Each of these
armies created different threats and influenced power in different ways, but the perceived size and strength of a
nation’s military, whatever the form, has long had the ability to generate conflict by changing the perceived
balance of power.
The third category, technology, has also influenced the nature of conflict from the earliest days of the
nation-state. In the thirteenth century, the Mongols changed the nature of warfare through their development and
use of the recurve bow. The development of gunpowder followed by the musket, the rifle, and the cannon also
significantly effected the overall balance of power among the nations of the world. It should be noted that
technology in itself did not actually change the nature of war or impact the balance of power. The changes
occurred only when corresponding tactics and strategy were developed to effectively take advantage of this new
technology. Technology often generated some concern during its development, but until it was actually
employed, its full impact was not achieved. The Mongols even with the recurve bow, had to develop the
necessary cavalry tactics to use them effectively in battle. The musket was not fully effective unless used in
mass formations, while the rifle subsequently made mass formations less effective and gave power back to the
individual soldier.
One of the most important technological advances of the twentieth century was the development of the
airplane. The potential of airpower to influence military operations was recognized by many, demonstrated to a
certain degree in World War I, and further advanced by Billy Mitchell and others during the inter-war years of
the 1920s and 30s. However, it was not until World War II, particularly with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, that airpower began to significantly influence the balance of power.
Each of these categories has the potential to influence the relationships among nations in its own way, but
the combination of the three creates the overall perception of a nation’s strength. Whenever one nation has made
significant advances, whether in wealth, military strength, technological superiority, or a combination of the
three, other nations can feel threatened. The result is conflict.
In the twentieth century, technology has played a primary role in influencing the relationships among
nations. The most obvious example was the development and use of nuclear weapons. This technology brought
an end to World War II, but resulted in a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that lasted
for more than a generation—the Cold War.
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One of the most critical and frightening aspects of the Cold War was the “arms race” with nuclear weapons
that occurred between the two nations. Changes or increases in the nuclear arsenal of one state were met with
counter moves by the other state in order to ensure the perception that the balance of power remained equivalent
enough to prevent nuclear war. The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) where each country
possessed sufficient firepower to guarantee the nuclear annihilation of the other nation, in any scenario, was
simply one of the most recent examples of how changes to the balance of power drive conflict. It created
fear—the same underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War described by Thucydides more than two millennia
earlier.
An article by the noted historian Samuel Huntington attempted to determine whether this kind of conflict,
an arms race, actually precipitated war and, if it did, under what circumstances. Huntington determined that
while some arms races did, indeed, culminate in war, others did not. Huntington found that the critical point in
an arms race occurred during the very early stages. In Huntington’s logic, when one state attempted, through
new military capability, to change the balance of power, the opposing state could then choose one of several
courses of action. It could seek a diplomatic response through either an alliance with another nation to combine
forces. It could also attempt to enter into an arms treaty with the opposing power. If diplomacy wasn’t an
option, the threatened nation might increase its own level of arms (entering the arms race). It could attempt a
preemptive military strike to prevent the threatening nation from fully developing and deploying the new
weapon and changing the balance of power. Or the state may simply do nothing and allow the state developing
the weapons to achieve its goal.7
The military use of space is one of the most recent technological advances with the potential to
significantly impact the balance of power among nations. Space has, thus far, been developed by the military
primarily in support of terrestrial operations. It has significantly altered the way wars have been fought, but
space weapons have not yet been deployed that would actually attack other space systems or targets on the
earth. Many have argued that the United States should refrain from deploying space weapons because it would
create a space arms race that would not be in the best interests of the United States.8 This argument is founded
on two basic tenets. The first tenet is that a unilateral decision by the United States to develop space weapons
would unavoidably begin an arms race with other nations, and second, the belief that if conflict did occur
involving systems in space, the nation would most effectively respond and be better served by dealing with that
conflict here on earth. If the United States did choose to develop space weapons, would this lead inevitably to a
future war in space? How would the world respond? The model postulated by Professor Huntington provides an
effective method for answering these questions.
Huntington implies that other nations would only enter an arms race to preserve the balance of power. But
what if that balance of power was already overwhelming in favor of one side to begin with? Currently the
United States has no peer in the world either economically or militarily. The United States has become the
world’s sole remaining superpower. If the United States added space weapons to its already massive arsenal of
weapons, would this change the balance of power sufficiently to require other nations to respond? This is
doubtful. Any other nation—China, Russia, France, and others—would have to simultaneously develop a
robust terrestrial military capability while at the same time engaging in an arms race in space. Having the
ability to control space without at least a minimally effective force on the ground would be impractical. The
Russians and the Chinese currently are the closest competitors to the United States when it comes to military
power. The collapse in 1989 of the Soviet Union demonstrated to the world that entering an enormously
expensive arms race (which space weapons would certainly be) would have catastrophic results for a nation. No
nation today has the combined military or economic wherewithal to enter an arms race in space with the United
States.
Would another nation then take the next possible approach put forth by Huntington and decide to use
preemptive military action to prevent the United States from developing these weapons? With the exception of
nuclear attack, no nation possesses the military capability to take this action. Nuclear attack would be an
irrational and politically implausible response to the development of a space weapon resulting in a response-in-
kind by the United States. Thus again, preemptive military action is not a feasible option.
This leaves diplomacy as the only rational response for other nations, arms control treaties are the only
possible option remaining—and that is precisely what is occurring. There have been numerous efforts on the
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part of the Russians, the Chinese, and others to engage the United States in dialogue to prevent an arms race in
outer space. The UN General Assembly has, for many years, voted on a resolution for “Preventing an Arms
Race in Outer Space.” In 1998, it was resolution number 53/76 and the vote was 165 to 0 in favor, with four
nations abstaining—led by the United States.9
From the opposing perspective, if another nation should decide to develop space weapons, the United
States could respond in any of the ways described by Huntington. At the moment, the United States clearly
desires to leave all options open when it comes to dealing with the future of space—which helps explain the
vote to abstain on the UN resolution as well as numerous other actions that will be presented in depth at a later
point.
The United States is in a very advantageous position at the moment when it comes to issues of balance of
power. The United States can almost unilaterally make technological decisions with regard to these issues
without any real concern over the reactions from other nations. But technology is not the only aspect of conflict
that should be considered in today’s world. As the world approaches the twenty-first century, technology is
tending to become less important in defining conflict among nations.
A nation’s wealth, the economic aspect of conflict, is becoming ever more critical as the world’s economies
become increasingly interdependent. The Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey debated the economic causes of
war and conflict in his widely quoted book The Causes of War. He discussed how economics, although its
specific role has changed many times throughout history, has always played a major role in fostering the
conditions leading to war. While discussing the subject Blainey first quoted the Italian historian Luigi da Porto
who wrote in 1509, “Peace brings riches; riches bring pride; pride brings anger; anger brings war; war brings
poverty; poverty brings humanity; humanity brings peace; peace, as I have said, brings riches, and so the
world’s affairs go around.”10
Blainey then described how, over the latter half of this millennium, different links between economics and
conflict have evolved. Initially it was economic need, not abundance that drove conflict. A nation in need saw
opportunities available in more prosperous neighbors, and took action to gain the advantage of those
opportunities. Alternately, war often occurred because a nation’s leaders would try to divert attention away from
economic difficulties by engaging in war. Wars also resulted from the search for wider markets, natural
resources or new opportunities.11
In the twentieth century, economics has continued to play a critical role in conflict. One of the primary
fuels of the modern industrial revolution has been fossil fuel, most critically, oil. Access to oil has played, and
continues to play a role in conflict often resulting in war.
Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and their entry into World War II were due in part to fears generated
by U.S. and allied policy and activities in the Pacific in 1941 that cut off Japan’s access to critical oil reserves
necessary to drive their military and economy.12 The recent Gulf War was also driven in large part by economic
concerns related to oil. The United States and her allies feared a world where Saddam Hussein controlled a
significant percentage of the world’s oil reserves.13 Access to oil is still considered in today’s national security
strategy as one of the few, specifically designated, vital national interests of the United States.14 Economics has
clearly been and will continue to be a critical determinant of conflict in the modern age.
Economics in the preceding examples, caused (or threatened to cause) a perceived change in the balance of
power and thus forced nations to act. Thucydides was correct, although he looked at it mainly from a military
perspective. Changes in the military balance of power can still drive regional and international conflict and even
result in war—particularly when driven by deep-seeded religious or ethnic differences—but changes in economic
power can also drive conflict.
In the twenty-first century, changes in the economic balance of power have the potential for creating
conflict in ways that are difficult to imagine—because the world, the global economy, is changing so fast. In
1990, John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene published Megatrends 2000, where they tried to define their visions
for the future. In describing the economy of the future, they said, “The new global economy cannot be
understood if it is thought to be merely more and more trade among 160 countries; it must be viewed as a
world moving from trade among countries to a single economy. One economy, one marketplace, . . . In the
global economy, economic considerations almost always transcend political considerations.”15
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Naisbitt and Aburdene were correct in many of their observations and predictions. The global economy, the
global marketplace, the information superhighway, and other catch phrases have all become common, popular
ways of referring to the world as we head into the twenty-first century. In many ways, economic concerns have
become the most influential factor in national decisions. President Clinton’s 1992 election strategy was
organized around the key phrase; “It’s the economy, stupid!”16 Economic concerns have clearly been one of the
prime determinants in decisions made by the Clinton Administration.
Megatrends 2000, however, missed completely in predicting the future of conflict and war. Naisbitt and
Aburdene looked at Europe in the 1980s and saw a continent that had been at peace for forty-five years. They
had observed the end to the Iran/Iraq war and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. They believed
that, “it has begun to dawn on people everywhere that war is now an obsolete way of solving problems.”17
What they failed to take into account was Thucydides’ concept of power and fear. Even though they foresaw the
global economy, the failure of communism, the advancement of democracy, and the spread of free enterprise,
they failed to see how all these things would also create shifts in the power structure that would feed the fires of
fear, thereby unleashing conflict based on religious, ethnic, and economic lines. Because of this, they failed to
foresee wars in the Middle East, continuing conflict in the Persian Gulf, horrific violence in many parts of
Africa, and ethnic wars in the Balkans to name but a few. Sadly, war has not become an obsolete way of
dealing with conflict.
Changes in the balance of power, and the trepidation that this can create, will continue to drive conflict
into the next century. The world is now proceeding from the industrial age to the information age, and many
would argue that the United States is already an “information age” nation. The economic fuels that drove the
industrial age were fossil fuels—oil, coal, and natural gas. As mentioned earlier, access to this fuel often
changed, or threatened to change, the perceived balance of power and thus helped create the seeds for conflict
and war. Are there similar “fuels” that are required to drive the information age? Certainly, our
telecommunications network, the information superhighway, is one such critical fuel. The presidential
commission evaluating the critical infrastructure of the United States reported in 1998 that this network is one
of the more vulnerable aspects of the nation,18 but what about space?
More and more, as nations begin to understand and take advantage of the unique attributes of space, space
is also becoming such a fuel. Someday soon, if it hasn’t already, space will become a national interest every bit
as vital to the information age as oil has been to the industrial age. If this were the case, would the United
States take action to respond to a threat to this “fuel”? The current national security strategy, although it fails to
identify space as a specific vital national interest, states in no uncertain terms that the United States would
respond to such a threat. It does not, however, say how.19 It is not clear whether this would entail attacking
ground systems, attacking systems in space, working through the United Nations, applying economic
sanctions, or any combination of the above. All that is clear is that the United States would respond .
Is any response really warranted? Has space become a vital national interest that must be protected with the
power and might of the United States? What is unique about space that would cause this to be true?
To begin to understand the character and attributes of space and the potential for future conflict in or
involving space, it is necessary to take a step back and attempt to understand the unique position the United
States occupies in the world today and how this might impact the future. There are a number of historical
examples that can help shed light on this matter.
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Chapter 2
The Frontier
Military history can be depicted as a progression of frontiers from land to sea to air. With the conquest of
each frontier came significant military advantages. Crossing water afforded movement from shore to
shore, island to island, continent to continent. Traversing air reduced strike times from weeks and days to
hours, allowing a nation to take the battle deep into an enemy’s interior. Over the last few decades the
military frontier has moved to outer space . . .
—Senator Charles Robb, D–Virginia
Washington Quarterly1
Senator Robb accurately represented military history as a progression of frontiers, but the discussion of frontiers
can be applied to much more than just the military. It can also be applied to a study of the history of nations,
and not just through a discussion of the military challenges of the frontier, but by analyzing the political and
economic challenges of the frontier as well. Senator Robb proceeded from the remarks above to make a strong
case why the United States should not pursue space weapons. Others have looked at the very same logic and
made an equally strong case for developing and deploying space weapons.2 Both, however, base their
arguments strongly on this frontier analogy. What is it about the frontier of space that can support such
divergent viewpoints? Looking at the history of the frontier provides many lessons and a thorough analysis will
help shed light on the inevitability of and means for dealing with conflict in space.
Nearly every nation throughout history has had to deal with the frontier in one way or another. Nations
have had to concern themselves with protecting distant borders, preserving trade routes, conducting commerce,
governing distant territories, establishing civil institutions, and controlling their geographic area of concern. In
evaluating the current role of the United States in dealing with the frontier, it is helpful to evaluate the current
position it occupies—the world’s only superpower—and attempt to study similar historical examples.
The frontier, as a subject for historical analysis, has been extremely popular and many historians have
developed a wide spectrum of frontier theories. Frederick Turner conducted significant research on the
development of the frontier in the U.S. west.3 Hugh Elton and many others have explored the many facets of
the frontiers of the Roman Empire.4 W. Ross Johnson was one of many historians who evaluated the role of
mastering the sea as the frontier for the establishment of the British Empire.5 But perhaps one of the most well
respected scholars in analyzing the impact of frontiers on a nation is Owen Lattimore from Johns Hopkins
University. He spent much of his life traveling and studying throughout the world, particularly Asia, and has
published numerous volumes of analysis of the frontier in history and the role of the frontier in China.6 China
provides perhaps the most interesting historical analogy of the role of the frontier and how a government’s
ability to deal with the challenges of the frontier directly impacted that nation and the world as a whole.
Lattimore began his analysis of the frontier in history with a simple statement with far reaching
implications. He said, “A frontier is created when a community occupies a territory. From then on the frontier
is changed and shaped by the activity and growth of that community, or by the impact on it of another
community.”7
Under this simple definition, the Soviet Union created the frontier of space on 4 October 1957 with the
launch of Sputnik. It has been changed and shaped by the remarkable growth that has occurred since Sputnik
and by the tremendous impact space has had on the terrestrial community below. Very soon after Sputnik, the
world began talking about the next frontier of space. In 1962 Harold Goodwin from NASA published a book
entitled Frontier Unlimited where he said, “however we think of it, it is a dawning period and one that—in
scope and potential—promises to dwarf much of what has gone before . . . The sky is no longer the limit.
Space extends to infinity, and while the possibility of applying it to man’s needs may not be infinite, it is well
to keep in mind that we have not even begun to probe the full scope and extent of what space may make
possible.” We are still in the early stages of scratching the surface of the potential of space, but we are
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expanding into this new frontier rapidly and with vigor. Is it possible to learn lessons from history that can
help in understanding the opportunities and risks of dealing with the frontier?
Owen Lattimore did most of his research in the early part of the twentieth century, long before humans first
began to explore the frontier of space. His most thorough and interesting historical studies were of China. The
observations and analysis of the Chinese frontier experience which now follow are based on the works of Owen
Lattimore and the works of the noted Chinese historian John King Fairbank from Harvard University.8
For the greater part of nearly two millennia, China was home to one of the most powerful empires on
earth. The length of time in which a single Chinese empire dominated Asia dwarfed every other empire the
world has seen (including the Roman and British Empires). The Chinese empire was not, however, a
continuous experience. It was ruled by a succession of dynasties whose duration ranged from 21 years (the first,
Qin dynasty, 221–207 BC) to well over four centuries (the Han, 206 BC–AD 220). This is not to say that the
Chinese Empire was at peace for this period of time—hardly. Chinese rulers constantly had to be concerned
with problems and threats from inside the realm of their empire as well as from the periphery of the
empire—from the frontier and beyond.
The transition from dynasty to dynasty was often violent and sudden, but in most cases, was based on
issues (underlying causes) that had prevailed for quite some time and had been allowed to grow out of control.
Reasons behind the collapse of the dynasties included failures of the ruling party to effectively govern,
economic turmoil, religious opposition, military failure, and natural disasters.9 In each case, however, the
frontier played a critical role. To understand the role the frontier played in Chinese history it is not necessary to
examine all 2000 years. A study of the period from the Song dynasty (founded AD 960), through the Mongol
conquest (resulting in the Yuan dynasty in 1271), and ending with the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) will provide
more than sufficient insight.
From the very beginning of the dynasty period in China, the ruling powers had to concern themselves with
two primary functions: creating a civil administrative government and a sufficiently powerful military. They
not only had to concern themselves with these functions, but they had to structure them to allow them to
operate effectively in tandem.10 The administrators of the civil bureaucracy, in the tradition of Confucius,
tended to look down upon the military and believed that effective governing alone could, in general, keep the
peace through a ruler’s benevolent conduct. The military, on the other hand, believed in ruling by force and
doing whatever was necessary to preserve the dynasty. The conflict between cultivation (wen) and military force
(wu) would define dynasties through the centuries.11 This was most critically true when it came to managing
the frontier.
The various dynasties that ruled China tended to be based in the Yellow River or Yangtze River basins.
Each dynasty would set up their ruling court somewhere in one of these basins and rule from that central
authority. The further from the authority, the more the region tended to be treated like a frontier. China’s land
frontiers on the north, the west, and the south were generally comprised of the areas of Manchuria, Mongolia,
Turkistan, and Tibet.12 The dynasties, from the very beginning, attempted to take advantage of economic
resources from these regions, while at the same time, defending China proper from any threat the people in
these regions might cause. The earliest emperor, Qin, unified numerous local walls into the massive Great Wall
of China in an attempt to provide physical security for his dynasty. Each dynasty would also develop a civil
governing concept for these frontiers providing limited direction from the central authority, but always backed
up with the threat of military intervention should there be any difficulties. A balance between wen and wu was
critical to the success of the ruling power.
The Song dynasty (960) was firmly founded in the tradition of Confucius with a desire to govern with a
focus on peace (wen). The Song rulers de-emphasized the military and placed their attention on matters of
culture. Their ability to control the frontier emphasized peaceful, administrative control through a continuing
series of “benevolent” rulers. In great part, the people of the frontier were largely ignored as the emperors
focused on the central region and the court. It was a time of great innovation and it lasted for more than three
centuries. During this time, the silk and porcelain industries were developed, trade throughout Asia was
expanded, the economy flourished, and the printing press and gunpowder were invented. The compass was
developed and applied to local shipping for commerce. An elaborate inland waterway system was constructed
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with canals and locks that bolstered trade and helped to expand the economy to spectacular levels. But with the
focus on wen came the neglect of wu, and problems began during the earliest part of the dynasty.
The Song rulers were never able to effectively control the frontier and the boundaries of the empire were
continually shrinking as tribes on all sides began to push in. As the Song began to lose control of the frontier,
opponents in the frontier began to grow in strength—particularly the Mongols to the North. In 1206, Genghis
Khan united all the tribes to the north and his Mongol hordes began attacking in all directions, with
overwhelming success. Still the Song dynasty did not effectively respond. The Mongols were ruthless and
violent and, although they were brilliant military tacticians, they were looked down upon by the “noble minded
Confucians” in the Song court. Nevertheless, the Mongols continued their attack with ever increasing
conquests. By 1245 nearly half of the Song Empire had collapsed, and by 1271 the Mongols had completely
conquered China and set up their own court on the site of the present day Beijing.13 The Khan established an
empire that stretched from Persia through South Russia eventually encompassing all of Central Asia and China.
It was an empire founded on violence and destruction. The Song, devout followers of Confucius, believed up to
the very end that it was impossible for such a force to overcome their benevolent culture and take power.
Khublai Khan, the most able of the great Khan’s grandsons, established the Yuan dynasty in 1271 and
attempted to implement systems and structure to allow for effective rule—but his rule was based primarily
upon fear and violence. This focus on wu created an even bigger problem for the Mongol rulers than the focus
on wen had for the Song. Despite their amazing military prowess, they were never able to effectively govern, to
fully establish control of their vast empire and enormous frontiers. They were hated in all the areas they
conquered and their violent rule lasted less than 100 years.
The Ming dynasty (1368) was, by necessity, formed with a military focus necessary to drive out the
Mongols. The founder of the dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang, reigned as emperor for thirty years. His aim was to first
eliminate the Mongols and then to re-establish and maintain a form of centralized control over the Chinese
Empire. To this end, as Professor Fairbank described in his book China—A New History, “He issued a flood of
admonitions and regulations to guide his subjects’ conduct—law codes, commandments, ancestral instructions,
a series of grand pronouncements, village and government statutes, and ceremonial regulations.” 14 Zhu set up a
very demanding government, with severe sanctions to back up any failures, but it was a very effective means of
setting up a functioning civil authority throughout the empire, including the frontiers. His court was also
extremely concerned with the military.
Fairbank described this concern as follows: “Because China had to prevent a Mongol resurgence, he [Zhu]
copied the Mongol military system, establishing Chinese garrisons at strategic points and creating a hereditary
military caste of soldiers who would sustain themselves by farming, but be ever ready for war.” This effective
balance of wen and wu, between peaceful governing and military force, finally allowed China to control its
frontiers. The primary lesson learned, and followed by subsequent Chinese rulers to this day, was that a balance
had to be struck between military force and peaceful benevolence. If this relationship ever went out of balance,
then weakness would result, and the ability of the nation to control its frontiers, as well as provide for and
protect its people, would be significantly degraded.
This same lesson was demonstrated by both the Roman and British Empires. The Roman Empire faced
very similar challenges to those of the Chinese. The Roman concept of legions combined with local civilian
governments very closely matched the system set up by Zhu Yuanzhang to effectively govern and protect China
following the Mongol invasion. The British colonial system also provides a similar correlation. The British
Navy controlled the seas and Britain controlled the world, but effective local governments had to be established
to run the day-to-day operations of each colony. These governments would vary from direct British control as
in India to more of a hands-off monitoring in Africa and Asia.15 Britain controlled the frontier of the sea, but
they could not be everywhere, and neither could the Roman legions, and neither could the armies of Zhu
Yuanzhang. In all cases the control of the frontier was critical to the success of the great power, but it no case
could it be solely maintained through either civilian authority or military power. In all these cases, the frontier
could only be controlled through the effective balance of these two factors (wen versus wu).
This description of the frontier, expressed in Chinese history, although it provides some insight, does not
provide a complete understanding of the frontier as it relates to the frontier of space. For a more complete
understanding it is necessary to discuss the frontier in more fundamental terms. China, Rome, and Great
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Britain each provide bits and pieces of the puzzle, and by integrating them, the following concept will help to
provide a clearer, more fully developed picture.
The first stage of a frontier comes with the mere recognition of its existence. When people notice the
frontier, they become curious. They wonder what’s out there, is it better than where I am, and is it for me?
People begin talking among themselves, discussing and debating the virtues and mysteries of this largely
unknown place. Perhaps small numbers of people who have been to these frontiers visits them. Word begins to
spread and the curiosity grows.
Eventually it reaches a point where the curiosity is overwhelming and the opportunity presents itself—and
someone decides to explore the frontier. At this point the frontier is “discovered.” People discover new
advantages of this frontier—open space, natural resources, new sources of trade, new sources of manpower—and
they begin to exploit the frontier. They begin to travel to the frontier more frequently, establish commerce, take
advantage of the new people and resources, and then some of these travelers begin to stay. As they begin to
occupy the territory, they begin to transfer some of their customs and culture. They begin to establish rules of
society, local governments, and means for their own security. Eventually the frontier begins to be transformed.
They have established their “civilization” in this frontier and at this point, the result is a fairly “stable” society.
A simple, graphical representation of this progression would be the diagram in Figure 1.
China, Rome, and Britain all follow this model fairly closely. Transportation played a key role in the
development of each of their frontiers: over land in China and Rome, over seas in the case of Great Britain. But
in each case, the model is quite applicable. What the model doesn’t indicate is the essential role of the
government in allowing the progression to continue.
In each case, in order for the transformation to continue, the government had to provide economic, political,
and military support to the frontier. At different times in the progression, different amounts of support were
required from the different elements of society. Weaknesses in any of these areas would create an inability for the
nation to effectively control the frontier. Again, a balance between civil and military authority was necessary for
successful growth. Whenever this balance wasn’t achieved, whether it was a failure of civil or military power, the
frontier tended to collapse, and in each of the cases described, the power of the nation collapsed as well.
The United States began to establish their power on a global basis in the twentieth century through the
mastery of a different frontier—the air. Even though mastery of the air is geographically quite different from the
other frontiers discussed so far, the diagram in Figure 1 is still quite applicable to the U.S. experience.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the United States and the world for that matter were incredibly
curious about flight—about mastering the air. Eventually, the Wright Brothers “discovered” how to conquer
this frontier with their first flight in 1903. It wasn’t long before the entire world was attempting to exploit the
new frontier, for both commercial and military advantage. It was the United States, however, ahead of the rest
of the world, who first established real dominance in the air. The U.S. Navy became a global power with the
development of a battleship-based fleet, but in World War II, they secured the critical control of the sea through
the development of carrier aviation (through mastery of the air, not the sea). Likewise, in modern warfare, the
U.S. Army has achieved dominance on the ground only after achieving dominance in the air. Boeing, Douglas,
and Lockheed came to dominate the commercial aviation industry allowing this part of the U.S. economy to fly
past competitors around the world. The “stable” society that the international community finds in the air today
is due in great part to the strong commercial, civil, and military aviation policies developed and applied by the
United States.
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           Discovery/Exploration   Occupation
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Time
FIGURE 1. Development and Settlement of a Frontier.
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In many ways, the mastery of the air was simply the last phase of the industrial age. In recent years, for the
first time, the United States has begun to lose market share in the commercial aircraft industry.16 This decline,
although met with concern in some sectors, has not really impacted the overall U.S. economy in any large way.
This is, in part, because the industrial age itself is being eclipsed by a new age—the information age. The
information age has become the driving force behind the U.S. economy. Mastery of the air is not necessarily
essential to effectively compete in the information age; however, it will continue to be important for the
foreseeable future as the world continues to transition to this new age.
The new frontier that must be mastered in the information age is space. Space has tickled human curiosity
for centuries as well. Sputnik, Yuri Gagarin, John Glenn, and Neil Armstrong transformed curiosity into
reality. Humans now know that space can be explored. We certainly understand how space can be exploited in
many ways—commercial and military. But in applying the model in figure 1, space is still in the exploitation
phase, with just the initial forays being made into the occupation phase. The full occupation and even the
civilization of space are probably many decades, perhaps even a century away. But it is now, in the early stages
of the frontier, when the critical decisions will be made that will define the frontier of space. Is it possible that
another power could rise up, develop the means to control the frontier of space, and thus become the world’s
next great power?
Many nations around the world are asking this very question, and not just “recognized” space powers like
Russia, China, and France. In 1988, in New Delhi, India, Major General V. K. Madhok of the Indian army
published a book in which he discussed the future of space. India, at the time, had only the very beginnings of
any kind of space program, but their military leaders were already trying to determine the impact of mastering
the space frontier. In discussing conflict in space, General Madhok summed up his thinking with the following
remarks:
Could the winner in a Space conflict secure an unpleasant form of world supremacy? In a political situation
of this nature, could the votes at the UN become a meaningless exercise? These are the questions that will in
the future be discussed in seminars, lectures, and political and military circles with increasing concern. But
there is hardly any doubt that in time to come, Space cover will be as important as air cover. In this situation
countries which are not space powers could remain helpless spectators and the winner of the Space war could
well dictate terms to them.17
In the People’s Republic of China, current military thinking is even more blunt. In a recent article, Major
General Zheng Shenxia, President of the Air Force Command College in Beijing, stated unequivocally that,
“he who controls outer space controls the Earth.”18
If history is any indication, many scenarios involving conflict in space are almost certain to occur in the
future. Each frontier that humans have entered has eventually ended up as a theater of warfare. On the other
hand, the opportunities are there today for the United States, because of its unique position as the world’s sole
remaining superpower, to make the decisions and take the actions that will allow the world to more peacefully
resolve these conflicts—conflicts that will naturally come in the development of the frontier of space.
There are, however, and will continue to be, significant pressures that impact the development of the
frontier of space. These pressures come from both economic activity and military desires and necessities. Both
commerce and the military have tracked the frontier as it moved from land to sea to air, and they are continuing
to follow the frontier into space. Commerce has always been driven by the need for access (and quicker access)
to new markets and resources. The military continues to be driven by the need to protect both the core of a
nation and that nation’s interests in the frontier. How the United States responds to these pressures—pressures
that inevitably create conflict—will define space, and the use of space, in the next century.
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Chapter 3
Economic Pressures
The benefits our people will receive from the commercial use of space literally dazzle the imagination.
—President Ronald Reagan
July, 19841
The economic power of a nation is the most critical element of a nation’s strength. Though military power
remains a critical determinant of national prestige and standing, without economic strength, the military cannot
be effectively supported. Dr. Richard Cooper of Harvard University gave an address in 1995 where he looked at
the changing role of nations in the world and came up with the following conclusion. He believed, very
simply, that “Economic power is replacing military power as the decisive determinant of the nation’s standing
and influence in the world.”2 If this is indeed the case, then the commercial aspects of space, growing rapidly
already, will play a critical role in defining the future economic power of any nation.
The commercial sector of space is currently experiencing enormous growth. Over 500 companies in the
United States are currently involved in the space industry, with 1996 revenues of 77 billion dollars with the
market forecasted to exceed 122 billion dollars by the turn of the century.3 Though this is less than 2 percent of
the U.S. gross domestic product, it is greater than the entire gross domestic product for all of Israel or
Ukraine.4 The sheer size of the industry is impressive; but that in itself does not create any pressure—certainly
not pressures that could generate conflict. What is it about the economic aspect of space that makes it ripe for
such pressures, such conflict?
If space were truly limitless, then there would be infinite opportunities for human exploitation and conflict
could easily be avoided. In the broadest terms, space is infinite. Humans have little real understanding of the
size of the universe, but in terms of practical applications of space here on earth, space presents some very real
limitations. In order to provide an economic return, space systems (satellites) have needed to be in orbit around
the earth. This will remain true, at least for the foreseeable future. Probes into deep space will likely remain of
scientific interest only.
Orbits around the earth can be divided into three general categories: low earth orbit (LEO), medium earth
orbit (MEO), and geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO). The noted science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke first
postulated the commercial use of GEO in 1945 when he predicted the development of a constellation of
communications satellites orbiting over the equator more than 22,000 miles from the earth. This orbit would
provide the unique characteristic of allowing the satellite to match the rotational angular velocity of the earth
and thus remain apparently stationary over the same spot on the globe at all times. This prediction has indeed
come true with the bulk of television and large communication satellites currently occupying GEO orbits. In
1965, Arthur C. Clarke would comment on his prediction in an article with the partial title How I Lost a
Billion Dollars in My Spare Time.5 Looking at his prediction now, it appears his billion dollar estimate was
quite a bit low.
LEO satellites are defined as satellites operating in the lowest altitudes—an altitude just high enough to
allow satellites to remain in orbit (without significant atmospheric drag). In general, these satellites are located
between 200 and 1500 miles above the earth. This orbit is of particular advantage for missions that require
close proximity to the earth or to the customer. Examples of LEO missions are wireless phone service and
imagery. LEO is especially useful for these missions because it reduces the time delay created when sending
and receiving signals in higher orbit and it allows improved imagery resolution by placing the camera closer to
the area being imaged.
MEO satellites operate in the region in between. One of the most useful orbits in MEO is the
semisynchronous (12-hour) orbit at about 11,000 miles altitude. In this orbit, the satellite will cover the same
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ground track over the earth every day. This orbit is especially efficient for navigation and is currently occupied
by the Global Positioning System (GPS).
Each of these operating regimes has unique advantages and disadvantages, some of which create limits,
limits that create pressure on commercial operations in space. Perhaps the most significant are limits on the
positioning of GEO satellites. Since GEO satellites operate in a single orbital inclination (0 degrees) directly
above the equator and at a single altitude (22,300 miles), this creates definable physical limits where a satellite
may be placed. And because nearly all satellites at GEO are communications satellites of some type, they all
broadcast to the earth, many in similar frequencies. Thus the real possibility exists for one satellite to interfere
with another unless there is adequate physical spacing. The potential for conflict in this arena was recognized
long ago and the United Nations has tasked the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) with the
responsibility for allocating GEO orbital positions and operating frequencies. All nations are supposed to
register with the ITU for both position and frequency before launching and operating a satellite in GEO. The
ITU has, by design, no enforcement powers or authority. It is intended to be a coordinating agency helping to
control this complicated environment. In recent years, however, there have been a number of incidents where
nations have violated this arrangement. The Asian operating area has been an area where many of these
problems have occurred. This is due in large part to the large number of competitors vying for a competitive
edge in Asia.
China and Japan have long been rivals and have historic disagreements that only add to the problem. In
late 1993, through the auspices of the United Nations and the ITU, the two countries agreed to cooperate on a
broad range of space programs on which they shared common interests.6 It was hoped that this would be the
beginning of a period of increased cooperation concerning the use of space by both nations. On 21 July 1994
China launched a communications satellite (APSTAR I with customers including Time Warner, Turner
Broadcasting, Viacom, and ESPN) and placed it in an unauthorized GEO slot with only one degree of
separation between satellites operated by Japan and an international consortium in a slot “owned” by Tonga.7
Satellites in this region are intended to maintain two degrees of separation. China did this without notifying
the United Nations or the ITU. Japan immediately cried foul and raised the incident to the level of serious
conflict. A Japanese minister told Reuters shortly after the launch, “We’ll immediately take appropriate
measures if China switches on the transponders and causes transmission interference with our satellite.” He did
not explain what these measures would be.8 After tremendous pressure was brought on the Chinese, they finally
agreed, after six weeks, to move the satellite to another slot that they had to lease from Tonga.9
During January of 1996, the ITU supported the Pacific Telecommunications Conference to address both
GEO crowding and frequency allocations and developed a number of suggestions to alleviate this problem.10
Only a few months later, as reported by the United Nations themselves, severe crowding in the geostationary
orbital slots over Asia “led to the jamming of a communication satellite by PT Pasifik Satellite Nusantara
(PSN) of Jakarta, Indonesia, in defense of an orbital position claimed by Indonesia. This incident focused
global attention on a worsening problem of orbital crowding and caused the matter to be brought before the
October–November 1997 World Radio Communication Conference (WRC) of the 187 member-nation ITU in
Geneva.”11 The conference, after nearly six weeks, made only minor modifications to the procedures for
reserving orbital slots and came to no resolution as to the Indonesian jamming incident.
When contacted in September of 1998 about the incident, Rhea McGraw, a spokesperson for PSN provided
the following amplifying information, “There was (and continues to be) some confusion over ‘ownership’ of the
slot at 134 degrees East . . . both PSN and APSTAR IA [China] both claim ownership of that position. PSN
did carry out testing that may have resulted in the temporary suspension of broadcasting for APSTAR,
however, this was in no way intentional, was halted immediately, and has not occurred since. The ITU did not
get involved in the dispute settlement process, claiming bilateral negotiations were appropriate. The discussions
are ongoing, with no clear resolution in sight.” She later stated that the PSN (Indonesian) satellite project was
halted because of the monetary crisis in Asia. Indonesia, therefore, felt no immediate urgency to resolve the
dilemma.12
Should the economic crisis in Indonesia not have occurred, or if Indonesia should recover from the crisis, it
is not clear how this conflict (still ongoing) would be resolved. The ITU could have acted as an intermediary,
but has continually refused to get involved. Again, the ITU is not intended to be an enforcement authority.
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Who then would resolve the conflict? Even though Indonesia has a legitimate legal claim to the position, China
is occupying that position today and providing an important service for numerous U.S. and international
companies that rely on that satellite. Indonesia would be in a very weak position, although in the “right.” It is
difficult to imagine how this conflict would ever be resolved.
In September 1998, Space News, a weekly publication that follows the space industry very closely,
published an editorial that addressed the problems of overcrowding in GEO. The editorial discussed two
additional conflicts over GEO slots, one in Europe and one in Japan. It noted the difficulty regulatory agencies
have in trying to resolve such disputes. It concluded by stating, “regulatory authorities worldwide are going to
have to make choices rather than calling for compromise among quarreling parties. Conflicts are likely to
increase as available slots become a scarce commodity. The ITU and other regulatory authorities must resolve
these conflicts quickly and permanently, enabling satellite projects to move forward and meet the world’s
communications needs.”13
Even in lower altitudes crowding is beginning to become a problem. Even though there aren’t the orbital
limitations in LEO or MEO that restrict GEO, there is still significant spatial crowding to be concerned about
down low. NASA reports that more than 9,000 objects larger than 10 cm. are known to exist in orbit around
the earth and they estimate the population of particles between 1 and 10 cm. in diameter is greater than
100,000. They further postulate that the number of particles smaller than 1 cm. probably exceeds tens of
millions.14 If one of these objects, even a very small object, should collide with a satellite in space, the results
could be catastrophic. Two years ago a piece of debris hit the boom of a French communications satellite,
causing severe damage and sending it tumbling.15 The space shuttle has to maneuver every year or so to avoid
debris that could possibly impact the shuttle. The international space station will be one of the best protected
spacecraft ever flown, and even so, its most critical systems are designed to survive the impact of objects only
if they are less than 1 cm. in diameter.16 Any increase to the number of objects in space is a concern.
In LEO in the next decade, an explosion of commercial systems is forecast to hit the market to take
advantage of the booming wireless telephone industry. With these satellite phones, customers will no longer
have to worry about “dead zones” and areas of service. In November 1998, Motorola’s Iridium project went
operational with sixty-six satellites. Adding to the LEO boom are forecast to be forty-eight Globalstar
satellites, thirty-six from Orbital Sciences, twenty-four from GE Americom, sixty-three Celestri systems, and
the two hundred eighty-eight Teledesic satellite systems being financed in part by Bill Gates of Microsoft. This
growth in LEO satellites will continue to burden space operators, and even with improved, cleaner launches,
will only increase the debris and spatial concern problems in LEO. Article VII of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
says that states are liable for any damage to another state (and its citizens) caused by its space
objects—including privately owned ones.17 Traditionally, this has applied to space objects that reenter and
impact the territory of another nation, but, if one considers a satellite as part of a nation, then if it is damaged
by another state’s satellite (or debris), is that other state liable? This certainly creates increased possibilities for
conflict, although resolution of this kind of conflict would more than likely fall to diplomats and politicians.
However, an even greater possibility for conflict in this crowded regime comes not from spatial concerns, but
from frequency concerns.
The frequency concerns are so severe that it is difficult to describe the magnitude of the problem in a brief
study. The following examples represent only a small portion of the overall situation.
WorldSpace Corporation, a Washington D.C. based international company, is planning to operate the first
global satellite radio system allowing the world to have full access to a common radio channel for the first
time. However they are having severe problems attempting to coordinate and obtain approval to use its
operating frequency in the Western Hemisphere. Some U.S. industries have significant concerns about
interference should WorldSpace, as planned, operate their CaribStar satellite in GEO at ninety-five degrees west
longitude—where it could see all of Latin America as well as much of the southern United States. The
commercial aviation industry is concerned that spillover transmissions will disturb and interrupt telemetry
equipment on test aircraft. The Defense Department also believes that operation of this satellite would cause
unacceptable interference and has refused to coordinate on use of the planned frequency because of concerns over
aircraft interference. WorldSpace has been working hard to resolve the differences and have already settled
potential interference issues for their satellites over Asia and Africa.18 It is so difficult for companies to find
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open frequencies in which to operate that their only option is to operate in common frequencies and work out
interference problems with other users.
The frequency crowding problem is so severe that the U.S. government has had to take critical frequencies,
originally reserved for military operations, and develop methods for sharing these frequencies. The government
has done this with the military navigation satellite, the Global Positioning System (GPS)19 and the military
weather satellite, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). A detailed look at the DMSP
frequency problem provides an even better grasp of the overall problem.
A few years ago the Leo One USA Corporation applied to the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to construct, launch, and operate a forty-eight satellite non-voice low altitude mobile satellite service
offering data communication services including two-way data messaging, vehicle tracking, remote meter
reading, and other services to users in the United States and around the world. The most significant problem for
the FCC was finding a clear frequency to allow the satellite to operate effectively. On 13 February 1998 the
FCC authorized Leo One to proceed with their development efforts and use a complicated communications
operation requiring the sharing of frequencies with the military’s DMSP satellite. Specifically, “the spectrum
sharing plan . . . permits Leo One to share the 400.15–400.505 MHz and 400.645–401 MHz bands with
DOD’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (the ‘DMSP system’) by utilizing frequency hopping and
time-sharing techniques.”20 The diagram for Figure 2 represents less than 0.01percent of the operational radio
spectrum, but clearly illustrates the magnitude of the problem.
This describes the problem quite well, from a U.S. perspective, and demonstrates the difficulties
companies have in finding available frequencies—but it is not the entire problem. The United States, and
companies operating in the United States, has a difficult task in operating in this crowded environment, but the
international operating environment is even worse. The FCC allocates frequencies for operating in the United
States and the laws and power of the U.S. government enforce these FCC decisions. On an international basis,
the United Nations and the ITU are the only controlling authorities and they must attempt to regulate this
crowded complex environment without enforcement authority. The world attempts to come to agreement on
dividing the radio spectrum at the annual World Radio Conference sponsored each year by the ITU, normally in
Geneva. FCC Commissioner Susan Ness, in a September 1998 speech, described the problem as follows:
Frequency
MHz
DMSP
Downlink
Leo One
Downlink
FIGURE 2. Frequency Crowding.21
A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War 23
“Competing demands for spectrum have multiplied, even for bands that not long ago were considered the new
frontier. The globalization of wireless services has become reality, marked by a contentious 1997 World Radio
Conference that challenged our satellite and terrestrial industries to accept complex sharing and non-interference
proposals.”22 The FCC has a big problem trying to manage U.S. interests. The ITU has an almost impossible
problem trying to deal with this on an international level. Companies in countries without an effective
regulatory body can unilaterally decide to operate in a regime that can impact U.S. commercial and defense
concerns around the world. It is certainly a problem that will continue to create contention and conflict as
crowding of the spectrum continues to worsen.
Physical crowding and spectrum crowding will continue to worsen as time goes on. The boom in
commercial space has only just begun to take hold of the marketplace. The LEO proposals for commercial space
ventures discussed earlier in this are not just pipe dreams and wishes. Each of these proposals is backed by
some of the most powerful companies in the world. They have no doubt that space (and information) is the
future when it comes to the global marketplace.
In 1995, a group of these companies formed a group called the Satellite Industry Association (SIA) to help
promote the common interests of the commercial space sector. The SIA is the voice of this industry interfacing
(lobbying) directly with policy makers at the White House, the FCC, and Capitol Hill. Their mission is to
promote the role of satellites and satellite technology in the development of both national and international
projects. Some of its members include Boeing, Motorola, Hughes, PanAmSat, and Orbcomm to name, but a
few. In the 17 August 1998 issue of Fortune Magazine, the SIA took out a twenty page advertising section that
including not only advertising information, but also an article written by the senior business editor for Aviation
Week and Space Technology. The article summed up the message of the section as follows, “Ultimately, of
course, it will be consumers who decide which of the various systems succeed. But this much is certain:
satellites have become indispensable to the modern world, and hard as it may be to imagine now, their role will
only become more important as commercial space rockets into the twenty-first century.”23
Commerce is continuing to follow the frontier—now into space. The space sector is already quite large and
growing at a rate that is extremely difficult for national and international bodies to attempt to regulate.
Conflicts in commercial space, in terms of spectrum allocation and physical operating locations, are new to the
world, but will likely continue. For the military, on the other hand, conflict in space has been an item of
concern for decades. The massive growth in space, however, has made the problem for the military even more
complex.
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Chapter 4
Military Pressures
For the first time in history, the center of gravity of a military operation was located outside the earth’s
atmosphere.
—George and Meredith Friedman
Discussing the Gulf War in The Future of War1
It is easy to learn many invalid or incorrect lessons in analyzing the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. It is not
very often that the greatest military power on earth gets to fight a fool, in a desert, with unified world support
and six months to prepare. But the one lesson that seems to be valid and irrefutable is the lesson of information
dominance. Space played a key role in providing this information dominance. Because of a variety of
circumstances, the United States and its allies achieved a near monopoly on the use of space during the Gulf
War.
The issues of information dominance and the effective control of space have been important topics of
discussion since the earliest days of venturing into space. Concerns about military superiority in space helped
drive much of the Cold War for more than thirty years. In 1959, the RAND Corporation sponsored a conference
in Washington D.C. and invited leading thinkers from around the world to participate—the subject was
International Political Implications of Activities in Outer Space. Even though it had been only two years since
Sputnik, the conference discussed many of the same issues concerning the future of space that still face the
world today. Many forecasts made at the conference have come true, but some predictions were off—not
because of faulty logic, but because the world did not develop as the participants had expected. Karl Deutsch
from Yale University wrote: “it seems extremely improbable that any one power, alone or with its allies, will
have the ability to ‘control’ outer space in any way comparable to that in which the British navy may be said to
have controlled the seas in the nineteenth century.”2 But in the Gulf War, the United States and its allies were
able to operate largely uncontested in outer space. The assumption that caused Dr. Deutsch to be mistaken was
made by many at the conference—that the world would continue to be bipolar, if not multipolar, long into the
future. The possibility of a world with the United States as the sole remaining superpower was not conceivable
in the minds of these thinkers in 1959, during the height of the cold war. But despite this mistaken view of the
future, the critical role of space for the military was indeed well understood and a vision for the future of the
military in space was clearly set out. The concepts discussed and developed at this conference would define and
drive the development of military space systems for more than thirty years.
Specifically, the key question posed at the conference was: “Would a lead in space technology by one of
the Big Two (later on perhaps the ‘Big Few’) confer on it decisive military superiority over the other (or
others)?”3 Political and military planners at the conference and in subsequent decades clearly felt the answer was
yes.
Leaders in both the Soviet Union and the United States aggressively went after the new frontier of space for
two reasons: (1) to take advantage of the unique attributes of the space environment, and (2) to make sure they
kept up with the enemy, preserving the balance of power between east and west. It was a clear example of
concerns about changes to the balance of power and a resulting arms race.
Although the full concept of information dominance and the role that space would play was not well
understood at the time (and is still being further defined even today), the military missions for which space
could provide unique advantages were being pursued from the very beginning. In 1965 a book was published
by Lillian Levy that included a collection of twenty-two essays by some of the nation’s political, military, and
social elite. It was entitled Space: Its Impact on Man and Society and included articles by President Lyndon
Johnson, astronaut John Glenn, and NASA Administrator James Webb to name a few. General Bernard
Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command, wrote an article discussing the many roles for the
military in space. In one section of the article, he discussed the future role of space in supporting warfare,
26 Chapter 4—Military Pressures
specifically how “space systems would enhance the defense of the United States by increasing in many ways the
military capabilities of our terrestrial forces. For example, they can provide early warning of a missile attack
and perhaps ultimately they may even afford an active defense against ballistic missiles. Surveillance weather
satellites can report meteorological conditions, and communications systems can improve the response and
provide the command control of our forces.”4
Military space systems have been developed over the past decades to accomplish nearly all the missions
foreseen by General Schriever and others at the beginning of the space program. The only exception is active
defense against ballistic missiles using systems based in space. The Soviet Union, during the same period of
time, developed similar systems to perform each of these missions as well, with the same exception. This
exception was not solely because of physical or technical limitations preventing such a defensive system, but
because the United States and the USSR had agreed not to develop such systems in the Antiballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty of 1972. By agreeing not to develop such systems, both parties hoped to limit the numbers of
nuclear weapons being developed by each side, prevent any significant change to the balance of power, and
reduce the chance for nuclear war.5
Over the years, however, both parties began to develop other space weapons that could either operate in or
attack systems in space. These weapons were, for the most part, designed to threaten the capability of the
enemy to fully exploit and control space.
The first attempts at space weapons were the use of nuclear weapons exploded outside the earth’s
atmosphere. The United States conducted tests in the late 1950s looking at the utility of such nuclear devices.
Operation Argus was a series of three live nuclear tests in 1958 that took place at an altitude of about 300 miles
to evaluate, among other things, whether nuclear detonations in space would create a radiation belt that could
damage or destroy the arming and fusing mechanisms for incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
warheads.6 The test series showed very little effectiveness against incoming missiles and reentry vehicles. It
did, however, demonstrate an enormous capability to destroy satellites in orbit. Further tests (for instance, Bold
Orion across the orbital path of Explorer VI in 1959) proved the feasibility of such anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons, but President Eisenhower decided that there was insufficient need for deployment.
During the early 1960s, the Soviets began work on their own nuclear space weapons program—but with a
different focus. They began to develop both an orbital bombardment system (OBS) and a Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS). The OBS was designed to place a nuclear weapon in LEO “where it would
remain until commanded to reenter the atmosphere and strike the United States.” The quick strike capability of
such a weapon would potentially reduce the warning time for the United States and thus prevent any quick
retaliatory response. The FOBS was a system that would launch a nuclear weapon from Soviet silos into orbit
and then “reenter the atmosphere and attack its target before completing a full revolution.” This design was
intended to allow the attack to sneak in under the line-of-sight radar and avoid the bulk of the U.S. early
warning system then concentrated at looking over the North Pole.7 These were some of the challenges facing
President Kennedy during his presidency, and the conditions that caused him to choose the words that were
used in the introduction to this paper. To repeat his words again, “I do not say that we should or will go
unprotected against the hostile misuse of space any more than we go unprotected against the hostile use of land
or sea, but I do say that space can be explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating
the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours.”8
To respond to the threat posed by these Soviet initiatives, President Kennedy directed the development of a
U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) capability called Project 437.9 At the same time Project 437 was being developed,
President Kennedy also entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union in an attempt to agree to ban the
deployment of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons) in space. President Kennedy believed that the
continuing peaceful exploration of space could not continue with such a frightening nuclear threat. Any nuclear
exchange in space would prevent man from successfully using space for any purpose for many years into the
future. After President Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Johnson continued both the development of
Project 437 and the treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Johnston Island ASAT went operational in
1965, but in 1967 its reason for being was eliminated when the United States and the USSR signed the Outer
Space Treaty prohibiting, among other things, the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space.
A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War 27
This did not, however, eliminate attempts to gain the upper hand in space. First the Soviets, then the U.S.
in response, attempted to develop conventional ASAT weapons. The Soviets, very soon after the Outer Space
Treaty was signed, began to develop and test a co-orbital ASAT system. The system would launch a satellite
into an orbit matching the target of interest, and when in proximity, it would explode a conventional device in
an attempt to destroy the target with debris. In response to this non-nuclear program, President Ford directed a
development program that became the miniature homing vehicle (MHV) program. This system would launch a
missile containing the MHV hit-to-kill warhead from an F-15 aircraft. This warhead would be placed on an
intercept trajectory toward the target and contained a seeker that would allow the weapon to make any final
adjustments necessary to allow for a successful intercept—at extremely high velocities. This kinetic energy
intercept would destroy the target.
The Soviet co-orbital ASAT was tested against objects in space twenty times over fourteen years with only
nine successes. The air-launched MHV program was only tested against an object in space one time (1985). The
test was successful, the target satellite destroyed, but the system never went operational. The MHV program
was canceled in 1988 because of congressional restrictions to prohibit further testing, technical difficulties, and
cost overruns.10
Both the Soviet Union and the United States also pursued the development of directed energy weapons that
would potentially have significant ability to control space, but no operational capability was ever fielded. The
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s threatened to change the perceived balance of power and caused
the Soviet Union to expend enormous resources to try to keep up, but again, no operational capability was
achieved.
Throughout the cold war, both sides sought to develop space systems in order to provide improved support
to terrestrial military operations. Both sides succeeded in this effort. They also sought to develop systems that
would ensure their ability to control space in the event of conflict on the earth. These efforts met with very
little success—never enough to, in reality, change the balance of power. Space power between the two
superpowers (given the view of historical perspective) maintained a rough parity. At times, one side would
appear to step slightly ahead with some breakthrough in technology, but the other side would almost
immediately level the playing field. But in terms of the military pressure on space, the Cold War and its
supporting space arms race defined this pressure for more than thirty years. The fall of the Soviet Union
changed that.
The Gulf War occurred nearly simultaneously with the end of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had
been weakened by severe internal problems and Mikhail Gorbachev had been seeking to define a new Soviet
Union through perestroika—a system of reforms to all of Soviet society implemented in the latter half of the
1980s. In 1990 and 1991, the Soviet Union, for the first time since World War II, supported the United States
in a military action—in this case through the United Nations in the effort to remove Iraq from Kuwait. So
although the actual systems in space changed very little from the 1980s into the 1990s, the ability of U.S.
space systems to impact the battlefield changed extraordinarily.
The United States, working with her allies and without interference (and even with some help) from former
Soviet enemies, was able to achieve a near space monopoly over the battlefield and reap the benefits of the
information dominance that resulted. In the introduction to the book The First Information War, Alan D.
Campen described what occurred like this: “The United States unveiled a radically new form of warfare in the
Persian Gulf in 1991. By exploiting knowledge, it devastated Iraq’s formidable military machine, astonished
the world, confounded defense critics, surprised itself and quite possibly ‘changed the standards for performance
of U.S. forces in armed conflict.’ By leveraging information, U.S. and allied forces brought to warfare a degree
of flexibility, synchronization, speed, and precision heretofore unknown.”11 This was due in great part to the
allied freedom to operate in space.
But Campen also challenges whether Desert Storm was a valid test. He asks the questions that all military
men and women must ask in evaluating this conflict. “Will it be a harbinger; one of those defining moments in
military history that shapes force structure and doctrine? Or, will it be dismissed as an aberration—the product
of an improbable scenario and unworthy of serious study?”12
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As stated earlier, the benign role of the Soviet Union was a key factor in the conflict. The fact that Iraq
could not access the same type of information available to the allied coalition put them at a distinct
disadvantage. But this was also the first time, in any major conflict, where space information was readily
available on a tactical level to U.S. forces. U.S. space systems were developed primarily to support the strategic
conflict with the Soviet Union. They were not originally designed to influence the tactical arena. By the time of
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, they had finally reached sufficient maturity to allow their integration on the
battlefield, and the change was extraordinary.
Speaking after the conflict was over, General Thomas Moorman, then commander of Air Force Space
Command, summed up the views of many when he observed:
Desert Storm was a watershed event for space systems. Satellites and the ground systems and people trained
to control them played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict. Space owned the battlefield. We had a
robust on-orbit constellation and the inherent spacecraft flexibility to alter our operations to support
specific needs of the terrestrial warfighter.13
This was one of the critical differences in the Gulf War, perhaps the most important new difference. Space
“owned the battlefield.” Satellites were able to adapt to support the tactical as well as the strategic situation.
Space systems allowed planes, ships, tanks, and the individual soldier to navigate in a foreign environment
with accuracy better than a few meters. The enemy could not. Space systems provided information to describe
specific weather conditions and reconnaissance information over a target area many hundreds of miles from the
attacking force. The enemy force was effectively blind. Space systems provided critical missile warning
information of incoming attacks from Scud missiles. The enemy had no warning of attack and expected no such
warning being available to the allies. Space systems allowed secure, robust communications among the allied
forces spread out throughout the theater. After the first week of the Desert Storm air attack, the enemy had very
little communications capability from Baghdad to the dispersed Iraqi forces. Space systems, for the first time,
provided an important advantage, and just as importantly, were not interfered with by the enemy.
The conflict turned out to be perhaps the most one-sided war in the history of warfare. This is not to say
that allied forces would have failed without this information dominance. Allied weapons and training were
clearly superior to those of the enemy. However, the price of victory, in terms of casualties and loss of life
would have been much higher. Prior to the conflict, predictions were made about casualties in the tens of
thousands and a war that would last for more than a year.14 Neither of these predictions was even close to the
truth. A great deal of the difference could be placed upon the improved accuracy and lethality of U.S. weapons.
Airpower, for the first time, began to live up to the expectations of airpower theorists from Mitchell to Douhet.
But the radical change that occurred on the battlefield was because of improved information—information to
define targets, pinpoint the enemy, provide the weather, and navigate quickly throughout the theater. Space and
information systems provided this difference. It would be very difficult to imagine the U.S. military engaging
in conflict in the future without attempting to secure a similar advantage.
But what systems will the United States have to counter in the next war? The possibilities are many and
difficult. Addressing a number of different military mission areas will help to define the threat of the future.
Communications
In the Gulf War, Iraqi communications were primarily via landlines. In the first days of Desert Storm,
telecommunications centers were destroyed by allied airpower, effectively removing Saddam Hussein’s ability
to centrally command and control, and in many cases even communicate, with his fielded forces. In the next
war, the United States will likely attempt to sever the ability of an enemy to communicate with its forces. Any
potential enemy in the future is likely to be aware of this U.S. strategy.
Future Complications
On 18 July 1997 at a meeting of the ITU in Geneva, 120 industry and government representatives agreed to
reduce constraints on the international, cross border use of wireless telephones. Licensing of these types of
phones and carrying them across borders will become much easier as customs regulations and duties are phased
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out.15 On 1 November 1998 the Iridium constellation of LEO communications satellites became operational.
Now, a user with an Iridium telephone can communicate with any other phone anywhere in the world. It is
possible that an enemy, with little ingenuity required, could develop a rudimentary communications capability
that would ensure continued uninterrupted communications and basic command and control of fielded forces
even in the face of a formidable air attack from the United States. If Iridium was the only international provider
of such a service, perhaps regulations or strategies could be developed to prevent or defeat such a concept. But
how do you defeat such a concept when the enemy can choose among Iridium, Teledesic, Globalstar, Orbital
Sciences, GE Americom, Celestri, or some other (perhaps European or Japanese) commercial provider?
Navigation
In the Gulf War the United States exploited, for the first time in combat, the GPS constellation to provide
navigation for forces throughout the theater. Although not all allied forces were equipped to take advantage of
GPS during the conflict, it provided an enormous advantage to forces in the desert. The enemy had no such
capability, and even though they were fighting on familiar soil, they were at a disadvantage in maneuvering and
targeting forces.
Future Complications
In the last few years, GPS has become a global utility providing navigation for everything from aircraft to bass
boats to cars. Not long ago, a hand held GPS receiver was difficult to obtain and cost well over $2000. Now a
receiver can be ordered off the INTERNET for less than $90.16 The GPS signal is now available throughout the
world and, because of increased civilian reliance, will never be shut off in case of national crisis. Any potential
enemy could attempt to take advantage of the GPS signal and provide navigation to his military forces—from
the soldier, to the airplane, to the guided missile. Efforts to defeat such a strategy (NAVWAR) have begun,17
but defeating such a strategy is difficult without impacting your own forces as well—especially because the
U.S. military now relies on GPS even more heavily than during the Gulf War.
Reconnaissance
Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was able to obtain satellite overhead imagery from the French company Spot Image.
As the allied forces began to deploy into theater in Desert Shield, the French agreed to stop providing this
service to the Iraqis. The only other providers of imagery at the time were the United States and the USSR so
Iraq, without any effective air or space reconnaissance, was effectively blind to any allied movements during the
entire war. This was critical in maintaining the surprise of the final flanking movement to the west (the “Hail
Mary”) of the final ground offensive.
Future Complications
Several independent U.S. ventures are attempting, at this moment, to raise enough funding to launch six
spacecraft within the next few years to provide overhead imagery with resolution as sharp as one meter.
European efforts are also proceeding in this direction at a somewhat slower rate, preferring to focus for the time
being on a more medium resolution market.18 The U.S. government is closely monitoring this situation and
struggling with ways to somehow keep high-resolution imagery out of the hands of potential adversaries. It is
not clear, from a commercial perspective, whether there is a sufficient market to support this many initiatives.
What is clear is that imagery, with resolution good enough to provide military utility, will be available through
a variety of sources within the next few years. If it is available on the open market, will it be possible to
prevent critical imagery from being obtained by a future enemy in conflict with the United States?
These are but a few of the military pressures on the frontier of space and the answers to many of the
questions posed are still unknown. These pressures don’t even take into account the tremendous pressures that
would occur, during the next conflict, if another government with indigenous space capabilities (Russia, China,
France, and others) would happen to either be the adversary or support the adversary in the next major crisis
involving the United States. These pressures, although maybe not as well defined as the pressure applied by the
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Soviet Union during the Cold War, are enormous pressures nonetheless—perhaps even more far reaching in
their implications for the future. The pressure would become even more extreme should an adversary develop
the capability to attack and degrade our space systems, but as Bob Bell, currently serving on President
Clinton’s National Security Council, told the Air Force Magazine in February of 1999, “we don’t have the
option of turning the clock back and negotiating some arms control treaty with Russia . . .” The problem is
much more complicated today. We have to figure out how we [the United States] are going to control space.19
The rapidity with which space is changing is perhaps its most difficult challenge. Space systems are
proliferating at such an enormous rate that figuring out how, or whether it is even possible, to control space is a
daunting task. For many years, the U.S. military dominated the space business in the United States. In just the
last few years, the military has become a minority partner, almost a “niche” market.20 Space information that
can be used for military purposes in some cases is becoming more and more readily available to a variety of
users. This kind of information can change the course of a conflict in the future, regardless of whether that
conflict develops into a war.
The U.S. military has learned that information will be key in any future military conflict. Doctrine,
strategy, and operational concepts have begun to change over the last few years to take into account information
operations and space control. The current National Military Strategy (1998) states very clearly that “success in
any operation depends on our ability to quickly and accurately integrate critical information and deny the same
to an adversary. . . . As we will continue to do at sea and in the skies, we will also endeavor to maintain our
current technological lead in space as more users develop their commercial and military capabilities. . . . Space
control capabilities will ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom to
adversaries. . . . Information superiority allows our commanders to employ widely dispersed joint forces in
decisive operations, engage and reengage with the appropriate force, [and] protect the force throughout the
battlespace.”21
The United States dominated the use of space in supporting the Gulf War. Space was a critical factor in
establishing the information dominance that was so critical in the successful prosecution of the war. The
military expects to use space, and control space, to achieve information superiority in future military actions.
How, with the vast proliferation of space systems throughout the world, can this be carried out? The answer is
not clear, and this, along with the other issues described in this chapter, are only a few of the many pressures
the military is facing in the new frontier of space.
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Chapter 5
A Vital National Interest
New frontiers—in space and on earth—are always risky . . . and often dangerous
—Dan Goldin
NASA Administrator1
The pressures on the space frontier are enormous—from both an economic and a military perspective. Looked at
in isolation, each of these pressures is severe enough to create conflict. In combination, they create the risk that
future space conflicts could result in war—either on earth, in space, or both.
On the economic front, conflict has already occurred because of crowding in GEO orbits and through
saturation of the available radio spectrum. On the military front, conflict has been avoided because the United
States, in recent years, has retained an effective monopoly on the use of space during conflict.
Conflicts involving the commercial use of space will continue to increase as crowding increases. There are
limited unoccupied slots at GEO and a limited spectrum remaining to be allocated. On the military side, one
cannot imagine the United States allowing an enemy to either threaten U.S. space capabilities or use space
systems to their advantage, putting the U.S. at risk. Conflict involving space systems could be a significant
part of the next major theater war involving the United States.
Space is such a diverse frontier that predicting how conflict will occur is a challenge of infinite
possibilities. What is clear, however, is that future conflict will likely be derived from the two interests heavily
dependent on space—the commercial sector and the military. The pressures of these two sectors will precipitate
conflict in two areas: (1) conflict over the use of space as a precious “fuel,” necessary for economic prosperity
and military imperative, or (2) the continuing development of space as a frontier. Conflicts in the first category
are of immediate concern. Conflicts in the second are longer term.
Space as a Fuel for the Economy: The Immediate Concern
As discussed in the earlier chapters, space has reached a point of critical importance as a fuel for the information
age. But to understand the full impact on the United States of space as a fuel, it is first necessary to look at the
October 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS). The current NSS makes it clear that, because of tremendous
demands for U.S. action in a multitude of arenas, the President and the nation need to look at U.S. national
interests in three broad categories: vital, important, and humanitarian. Only vital national interests will result in
the most significant national response. A vital national interest is defined specifically as:
Those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Among these are the
physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, our economic well-being
and the protection of our critical infrastructures. We will do what we must to defend these interests,
including—when necessary—using our military might unilaterally and decisively.2
Vital interests of the United States, for the most part, are only talked about in general terms in the
document. In only two places are vital interests specifically identified in the NSS, and they both provide
interesting insights. First, in the section on Providing for Energy Security, the NSS states, “Conservation and
energy research notwithstanding, the United States will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to
foreign oil sources.”3 Second, “The United States has vital security interests in the evolution of Russia,
Ukraine, and the other newly independent states into democratic market economies, peacefully and prosperously
integrated into the world community.”4 In all fifty-nine pages of the National Security Strategy, the only two
areas that are specifically identified as a vital interest in any way are both related to economic aspects of the
world. How does this relate to space? With regards to space, the NSS also says:
Our policy is to promote development of a full range of space-based capabilities in a manner that protects
our vital security interests. We will deter threats to our interests in space, and if deterrence fails, defeat
hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space. We will also maintain the ability to counter space
systems and services that could be used for hostile purposes against our ground, air, or naval forces, our
command and control system, or other capabilities critical to our national security.5
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The vital security interests in the above paragraph are not specifically defined. In this, and other sections
where it is mentioned in similar terms, it is left for the reader to interpret what these vital interests might be.
General Howell Estes, former CINCSPACE, said in a speech in 1997, “More than ever, it is important that all
Americans understand . . . our investments in space are rapidly growing and soon will be of such magnitude
that they will be considered a vital national security interest on a par with how we value oil today. And, that
the understanding of what space means to us as a nation and the support of all the U.S. are both critical for
making the hard decisions required to realize the full potential of space in the years ahead.”6
Given the critical role that space now occupies for both economic prosperity and national security, for all
intents and purposes, space has already become a vital national interest for the United States. By simply
changing the term “foreign oil sources” in the declaration of vital interest for providing energy security, the
following statement results: the United States will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to space.
Space is a critical fuel for the information age. The United States has maintained the world’s leading
economy by being the first to take advantage of the benefits of the information superhighway. Space, still a
young industry, already accounts for more than $100 billion in business for U.S. companies. Space has
significant limitations in terms of spatial crowding and spectrum allocation that cause concern for future
business development. Space is also the fuel that helps propel U.S. military capability—with inherent
vulnerabilities that must be protected.
The Continuing Development of the Frontier: A Long Term Concern
As time passes into the next century, the frontier of space will become even more complicated—ripe with the
potential for more dangerous conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2 and explained by the diagram in Figure 1,
space is currently early in its development as a frontier. It is still in the phase of exploitation just beginning to
be occupied by humans. The concern in this phase, the exploitation phase, is about conflict as described above.
However, taking a longer-term perspective, as it becomes more and more common for humans to live in and
travel through space, the possibility for conflict will increase dramatically. What used to be science fiction will,
in the next century, become reality. When an aerospace plane is developed, making space travel common among
the nations of the world, a new military capability will inherently be possible. Each time a new outpost is
established, the possibility for economic or military advantage must also be considered. In each of these cases,
the possibility for conflict increases, and along with escalating conflict comes the possibility for war.
Each time a conflict occurs, nations will struggle with means for a peaceful solution. Peaceful solutions are
in the best interests of all concerned whenever common ground can be found. When peaceful solutions cannot
be found, however, war can occur. It may not occur for many decades, but the current approach by the nations
of the world, would indicate that it is inevitable. A continuing cycle of conflicts will take place over the
coming decades, with different methods of resolution. If these conflicts can be resolved without damaging or
destroying the space frontier for continued exploitation and occupation, then eventually space will mature to the
point where it is fully used by society. “Civilization” will have been established, issues concerning its further
use will have been resolved, and space will reach a point of relative stability. Even as it reaches stability,
however, conflicts will continue to occur from time to time requiring the involvement of the nations of the
world for resolution (hopefully peaceful). Again, this requires a longer-term perspective, which is sometimes
difficult. The diagram in Figure 3 below (an expansion of Figure 1) should help solidify this long-range view.
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If the history of the world and the history of the frontier are any indications, then war in space is
impossible to avoid. It is just a matter of time.
But President John Kennedy in 1962 saw a different view of the future. As stated in the introduction,
President Kennedy believed that space could be different: “I do say that space can be explored and mastered
without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around
this globe of ours.” Can space truly be the first frontier in which man does not make the mistakes of feeding
the fires of war?
Now is the critical time when the important decisions need to be made. These decisions will define the
future of space for the next century. Postponing these decisions will only feed the fires that President Kennedy
believed could be avoided. What are these decisions? What actions need to be taken? The next part of this study
will be devoted to answering these difficult questions and understanding how the United States can more
effectively prepare to deal with the inevitable conflict in space .
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Chapter 6
The Military Instrument of National Power
The United States military must guard against having our dependence on space turn into a vulnerability.
Thus, protecting our freedom to use space and having an ability to deny an enemy’s use of space will grow
more important in the future. We know that when the challenge comes, our nation’s leadership will turn to
us for answers.
—General Howell M. Estes III
Commander in Chief, United State Space Command1
There is no doubt in the minds of most of the members of the U.S. Space Command that conflict in space is
inevitable and that, in the not-to-distant future, America will look to the military to deal with that conflict. The
U.S. Space Command has studied the future, developed a vision, and is now, through the military services,
beginning to pursue critical technologies and programs that would allow this vision to become a reality.
Although many military leaders have come to appreciate the criticality of space in the future of warfare, they
have not yet embraced the full vision of the Space Command.
The President, via the administration’s National Space Policy, has directed the Department of Defense to
execute four basic missions in space: space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application.
The National Space Policy does not explicitly define these four important terms, but it does direct DOD to
accomplish the following: act as launch agent for the defense and intelligence sectors, maintain the nation’s
launch infrastructure, develop a new fleet of expendable launch vehicles, pursue improved and integrated
satellite control capabilities, pursue improved use of intelligence assets, and develop military unique
intelligence assets if necessary. The policy also states that the United States will pursue a ballistic missile
defense program for both theater and national missile defense and directs an advanced technology program to
support this effort. By far, however, the mission area that receives the most attention and the most specific
direction is space control—which, among other things, must deal with conflict in space. Using words
consistent with the National Security Strategy, the National Space Policy states:
Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control
capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.2
However, even though these or similar words have been part of national policy for many years, the policy
never specifically directs how DOD is supposed to meet this direction. It is left to the Pentagon to fill in the
details.
Each military service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) has component space commands subordinate to the
unified U.S. Space Command. Each of these commands is responsible for executing a specific portion of the
DOD space program. The Air Force is by far the largest of the component commands providing more than 90
percent of the military space budget and 93 percent of all military space personnel.3 The Air Force, in August
1998, published Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations. In this document the Air Force
describes, in detail, plans for dealing with each of the mission areas directed in national policy. A brief
description of each of these mission areas will help clarify the roles and responsibilities of the military in space.
Space Support
This mission area supports space forces. This mission is carried out by terrestrial-based elements to “sustain,
surge, and reconstitute” elements of a military space system or capability. These activities deploy and operate
spacecraft and involve launch and satellite operations.4
Force Enhancement
Force enhancement operations consist of those operations conducted from space with the objective of enabling
or supporting terrestrial-based forces. This is the most generally understood of the four military missions and
includes navigation, communication, weather, reconnaissance, surveillance and ballistic missile warning.5
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Force Application
The application of force would consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapon
systems operating in space. The Air Force explains that there are currently no force application assets operating
in space and that such systems would only be developed and used when it is consistent with national policy
and they are the best methods to achieve the military objective. Often, ballistic missile defense systems that
would be based in space are referred to as force application weapons. The Air Force, however, identifies this
mission as space control (see below) because such a weapon would not be attacking a target on the earth.6
Space Control
Similar to the National Space Policy, the Air Force doctrine document spends the most time and effort in
discussing the mission area of space control. To add additional emphasis to this mission, the Air Force also
places it as the first mission area in the doctrine document. Well over half the discussion of military space
missions takes place in the single mission area of space control.
Space control is the means by which space superiority is gained and maintained to assure friendly forces
can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy. To accomplish this, U.S. forces must
survey space, protect their own space systems, prevent adversaries from exploiting space systems, and negate
the ability of adversaries to exploit their own space forces. Counterspace is the mission carried out to achieve
space control. Offensive counterspace operations destroy or neutralize an adversary’s space systems through
attack on the space, ground, or link segments of these systems. At the current time, the principal method for
attacking these systems is through attacks on the ground segments or supporting infrastructure. Defensive
counterspace consists of active and passive operations to protect U.S. capabilities from attack or interference.7
Space control is the key for dealing with conflict in space. Although it is clear in the definitions and
descriptions above that space control need not necessarily include combat operations in space, the long term
vision of military space promulgated by U.S. Space Command clearly defines the need for space weapons in order
to accomplish the full space control mission. U.S. Space Command, in its Vision of 2020, clearly states “a need
to dominate space” that requires the deployment of robust negation systems. These systems must have lethal and
non-lethal capabilities, be able to inflict either temporary or permanent damage, and must be able to destroy,
disrupt, delay, degrade, or deny.8 U.S. Space Command’s Long-Range Plan defines the following end state:
By 2020, a robust and wholly integrated suite of space and ground capabilities provides total situational
awareness of the space region along with the ability to assure access, to, through, and from space while
defending against all hostile threats. It will require the development of new systems, concepts of operations
(CONOPS), and organizations to achieve and maintain space dominance.9
It is interesting to note that this vision for the future, in part, restates the current direction of the National
Space Policy (NSP) and National Security Strategy (NSS). The United States should have unimpeded access to
and use of space (NSS)10 and freedom of action in space and the ability to deny such freedom to adversaries
(NSP).11 Without the development of new systems (especially space weapons for negation), U.S. Space
Command is basically saying that it will be impossible to meet the current direction put forth by the President.
Military space planners, therefore, have laid out a detailed plan for meeting these deficiencies in the coming
years. It is a plan based first on the development of technology, but ultimately on the deployment of new
systems and new weapons.
Again, the Air Force has taken the leadership position in defining this future. In the mid-1990s, the Air
Force leadership (Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman and Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall)
published a vision for the twenty-first century Air Force entitled Global Engagement. In this vision, they
described the Air Force as in the midst of a transition of enormous importance. They stated:
We are now transitioning from an air force into an air and space force on an evolutionary path to a space
and air force. The threats to Americans and American forces from the use of space by adversaries are rising
while our dependence on space assets is also increasing. The medium of space is one which cannot be ceded
to our nation’s adversaries. The Air Force must plan to prevail in the use of space.12
This was an important statement for the leadership of the Air Force. In a way, much more significant than
ever before, the Air Force leadership was clearly stating that space is indeed the future of the Air Force. Such a
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future may be many decades away, but the path is clear. General Michael E. Ryan, current U.S. Air Force Chief
of Staff has sought to emphasize the importance of space to the Air Force today by resurrecting the term
“aerospace” to more accurately define the Air Force mission.
The term “aerospace” was coined in 1958 by General Thomas D. White to encompass the continuous
medium including both air and space. General Ryan has emphasized the importance of an aerospace force again
and again in many speeches and his words provide important insight. “We speak of aerospace power because we
no longer view space as a remote place beyond our reach. . . . As the second half of the twentieth century has
matured the air realm, the first half of this next century will mature our aerospace realm. . . . We should think
of the aerospace domain as a seamless volume, in which, and from which, we provide military capabilities in
support of national security.”13 The Air Force has been primarily responsible for military space for more than
thirty years and is planning to meet this new vision of an aerospace force in the twenty-first century.
The Air Force Space Command developed a Long Range Plan in 1998 to address the needs of this new
aerospace force. The plan called for significant upgrades in all space mission areas: the development of a new
generation of expendable launch vehicles; development of reusable launch vehicles; replacement of the current
missile warning satellites with the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) both high (at GEO) and low (at LEO)
to provide a more robust warning capability as well as support to ballistic missile defense programs;
development of a space based radar; upgrades to space weather and navigation satellites; development of a high
speed precision ground penetrater; and significant upgrades to U.S. space control capabilities including the
development of weapons necessary for such a mission, to name but a few.
Although the plan clearly states that both technology developments and policy decisions are necessary
before many of these systems can be developed and fielded, it is also clear that Air Force Space Command is
currently advocating and pursuing the technology for such systems. Perhaps most important, and unique from a
space perspective, is the introduction of the concept of migrating missions from air to space as time and
technology allow—when operating from space makes more sense, from a military perspective, than operating in
the atmosphere. The chart in Figure 4, taken from the briefing supporting the long-range plan, shows this
migration in very clear terms.
This is the vision of the Air Force—migrating missions from air to space when it makes sense from a
perspective of increased capability and improved cost effectiveness. This is the seamless environment of
FIGURE 4. Air Force Space Command Long Range Plan: Migrating Missions to Space.14
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aerospace that General Ryan envisions for the Air Force. Every mission should be evaluated to determine the
environment (air or space) that can most effectively accomplish a mission, and then systems will be built and
operated to take advantage of this environment.
The one mission that does not effectively migrate, is the mission of space control—the mission of space
superiority. But this is a mission that all Air Force officers understand completely. The first mission of the Air
Force in any conflict is to establish air superiority. Without air superiority, no other military missions are
possible without extreme risk. The same is true for space. According to General Ryan, “As we both militarily
and commercially become increasingly dependent on space-based systems—we must be prepared to protect
those vital equities in space.”15 Without control of space, other missions in space are at risk. It is not desirable
to migrate missions from air to space if those missions become more vulnerable in the space environment. In
order to achieve space control, the Air Force sees the need for the development of a myriad of new capabilities
in the future. The chart in Figure 5 describes the kinds of capabilities that will be needed.
Air Force Space Command developed these concepts in support of both the vision of the U.S. Space
Command and the vision of the Air Force leadership. The plan is thorough and complete, addressing all
missions and the need for significant upgrades in all four space mission areas. Executing this plan would also
be expensive, but the space planners understood this and addressed it as follows. Technology would be
developed over the next few years that would allow informed decisions to be made as to the effectiveness of
transitioning current missions to space. These missions have to be accomplished by the Air Force in the next
century, either in air or space, so decisions would be made when the technology is ready, and policy allows, for
the migration of a mission to space. The funding would become available at that time for the mission—the
medium where that mission would be accomplished would be a secondary consideration. When it makes sense
from a military perspective to develop a mission in space, the Air Force would step up to that mission. This is
the Air Force Space Command plan.
The Air Force leadership, specifically the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, supported the
concept and vision of this long-range plan, but also felt they needed additional insight to better define a
roadmap for proceeding into the next century. Therefore, the leadership tasked the Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board (SAB) with examining “the steps the U.S. Air Force should take in order to posture itself to make the
best use of space in accomplishing its assigned operational tasks in a rapidly changing world.”17 In November
of 1998, the SAB published a report entitled A Space Roadmap for the 21st Century Aerospace Force.
FIGURE 5. Air Force Space Command Long Range Plan—Space Control.16
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The roadmap is a detailed plan that responds directly to the tasking of the Air Force Chief and the
Secretary. It focuses on two basic elements: (1) a revolution in aerospace power and (2) a plan to pay for this
revolution. The first part is basically what the Air Force needs to be doing and the second part answers how.
In defining future requirements, the SAB provided two encompassing examples to illustrate the potential
of integrated aerospace power. Figure 6 describes the scenario for the first example. It is based on a system with
the capability to deliver precision-guided munitions integrated into a system that provides global, high
resolution sensing, precision targeting, and responsive command and control. This system “would permit
destruction of the target in less than an hour from a national command authority’s order with complete surprise,
immunity to currently fielded active defenses, and a lower prospect of collateral damage. It could equally well
conduct a photo reconnaissance mission to prove that a prohibited action was in progress.”19
Figure 7 describes the other end of the spectrum of conflict—a major theater conflict involving joint and
coalition partners. This figure indicates the critical role that aerospace forces will play in such a conflict. “Here,
space systems create information-rich warfighters, negate asymmetric threats like theater missiles, and make the
diverse elements of the force interoperable. These examples illustrate capabilities that have not been available in
earlier conflicts and that have enormous potential to promote the nation’s security and influence.”21
                       
FIGURE 6. Rapid, Precise, Global Strike Capability Illustrates the Potential of Aerospace Forces to Contribute in New
Ways to Achieving National Objectives.18
                       
FIGURE 7. Integrated Aerospace Power is an Essential Element of Joint and Coalition Warfare.20
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The SAB proceeds to describe the various technologies and programs that they recommend be pursued in
order to allow space (aerospace) to fulfill its true potential. The SAB also describes the funding challenges that
must be overcome in order to free up sufficient budget within the Department of Defense to allow these efforts
to move forward. The SAB makes numerous specific recommendations that would need to be implemented to
allow this growth. Their recommendations include the following.
1. Getting out of some mission areas all together—for instance, the launch business. Launch, and the
infrastructure that supports the nation’s launch industry, has traditionally been looked at as an Air Force
responsibility. The Air Force, in the future, should limit itself to military-unique functions that fall within
its “core competencies.” Launch should be developed and supported by the commercial sector, particularly
because the commercial sector is now the primary user of these facilities. The Air Force would then act as a
customer for launch, and not a provider.
2. The Air Force should buy commercial services whenever and wherever practical. The Air Force has
traditionally developed and operated unique space systems to support all military missions. In today’s
environment, many of these services can be purchased quicker and more economically from the commercial
sector while still meeting all the military’s requirements.
3. The Air Force should take advantage of partnerships and synergy among systems. In the past, air
and space have been developed and operated separately from each other, despite the fact that they were
largely developed within the same service. Airborne and spaceborne systems need to be developed as an
“integrated force structure” that is then optimized to meet the overall military requirement.
4. Streamline space operations. In the past, the Air Force has developed a large infrastructure using active
duty military personnel to operate and maintain space systems. Using commercial practices and contracting
out (outsourcing) certain non-critical functions, many thousands of military personnel could be freed up to
perform other critical missions.
5. The space budget will have to be increased as a portion of the overall Air Force budget. Even with
the savings achieved from the other initiatives described above, the Air Force will still have to make the
difficult decisions and reallocate budget authority from other programs to pay for the increased activity in
space. Failure to do so “will send a clear message to DOD and the world that the Air Force is not serious
about taking a leadership role and becoming the aerospace force that the nation needs.” The Air Force must
make the tough decisions. These decisions will have to be made at the expense of some air breathing
systems, but only when it is proven that space offers the ability to do the job better.22
The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, however, did not simply leave their recommendations in the
realm of such general discussion. To the contrary, the SAB took every mission area and defined the specific
programs that should be pursued. They then applied a cost estimate, using consistent methodology and
extensive analysis, to each of these initiatives and rolled up the cost into a budget estimate for the next twenty
years. They started with the current Air Force space budget, then looked at the Future Year Defense Program,
the budget for the next five years, and then applied a standard 2.2percent inflation rate through the out years.
This created a “baseline” space program from which to work. They then applied what they felt were conservative
savings that could be made via implementation of their recommendations and then laid the cost of new
programs and initiatives on top of that. The result is the table shown in Figure 8.
FIGURE 8. New Air Force Space Program Funding Requirements after Implementing Conservative Savings Initiatives.23
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The result of this analysis showed an increased funding requirement of $2 to $3 billion per year with initial
increases impacting other programs beginning immediately. The impact to other Air Force programs would be
lessened if (1) a more aggressive program of cost saving initiatives was implemented, or (2) Congress decided
to increase the overall Air Force budget to allow for the development of new space systems without making the
Air Force give up other programs, or (3) the DOD decided to fund the needed budget by transferring funding
from other services. In any case, it appears the Air Force will have to make some very difficult decisions in
order to fulfill this vision for space.
The U.S. Space Command, the Air Force Space Command, and the Scientific Advisory Board all make
strong and vigorous arguments that the military, specifically the Air Force, must move ahead quickly in space,
in all four mission areas. They all discuss the importance of space control and make recommendations for the
future, but most of the details in all the plans (concerning space control) have been classified. In the SAB
report, in particular, nearly all discussion of space control has been placed in a classified volume. It is clear
from the current focus of the leadership, however, that significant migration of missions into space will not
occur without guaranteeing the control of space. Space control and space superiority is the lynchpin that will
allow other activities to move forward.
Early in 1999, in an attempt to place additional emphasis on the space control mission area, the DOD
created a new Space Control Technology Program that will begin in fiscal year 2000. The new program will
deal with protection, prevention, negation, space surveillance, and command and control research and
development. Funding for this program was provided by the Air Force with other services encouraged to begin
similar efforts. According to the program direction, the focus of the new program will be in four key areas:
Protection activities include active and passive defensive measures to ensure that U.S. and friendly space
systems (including satellites, links, and the supporting ground segments) operate as intended by seeking to
overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and minimize damage if negation is attempted.
Prevention activities include measures to preclude an adversary’s ability to use U.S. space systems and
services for purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests.
Negation activities include measures to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy any space systems and services
used for purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests.
Surveillance and BM/C4I activities includes measures to monitor, detect identity, track, assess, verify,
categorize and characterize objects and events in space.24
The Department of Defense recognizes the importance of space control to the future and is beginning to
develop a coherent program that focuses technology on support to this mission area. But the importance of
space control is also recognized elsewhere within the executive branch of government.
In a 1999 interview with Air Force magazine, Bob Bell of the National Security Council discussed space
control in some detail. His view is that the concept of space control is changing. He addressed the subject this
way. “We need not be victim to ‘old think.’ The old think Cold War mentality was that we envisioned space
control as ASAT [anti-satellite weapon], and we equate ASAT with a dedicated system that went up and
destroyed something.” Bell emphasized that, “revolutionary advances in technology, particularly in the area of
information operations, are so phenomenal that . . . We just need to widen our horizon” beyond reliance on
ASAT systems to protect U.S. interests in space.25
In a speech to the U.S. Space Foundation, Bell stated:
There are a range of alternatives being explored or under consideration . . . and that are fielded and available,
including options for destroying or jamming the links between an adversary’s satellite and the earth. If we
were in a classified session I could say more, but I can’t.26
Space control is clearly in the minds of not only the military, but the National Security Council as well.
Space Command planners have developed thorough plans—well thought out in attempting to deal with the
inevitable conflict in space. These plans require the development of space weapons in the future. The Scientific
Advisory Board has evaluated these plans and provided recommendations to the senior leadership as to how
they should be implemented. The Department of Defense has directed a new technology program to focus on
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this critical mission area. All these plans, however, leave themselves open to criticism. This criticism, which
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, is not necessarily the result of faulty logic, but the result of
incomplete information. The military plans are open to criticism because they were, by necessity, developed in
a “military vacuum.” Without a thorough national debate and without specific direction from the President and
the Congress, the military is forced to look at the inevitable conflict in space and attempt to come up with
military unique solutions.
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Chapter 7
Criticisms of the Military Plan
Right now, space is sick.
—General Charles Horner, USAF (retired)
former Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command1
Criticism of the military’s plans and efforts are coming from all sides—from those who believe the military is
failing to step up to the challenges of space to those who think the military is going too far. All of the military
services have been facing severe funding restrictions, as the defense budgets have declined following the
collapse of the Soviet Union—the Air Force no more than the Army and the Navy. All the services are finding
it difficult to prepare for the challenges of the future while still meeting the obligations of today—from Bosnia,
to Kosovo, to Africa, extending all over the world as the U.S. military is called upon again and again to act.
The desire to aggressively develop military space is being tempered by fiscal realities. At the same time, many
in the nation strongly believe that space should remain a sanctuary for peaceful exploration and should never be
weaponized. There are many competing criticisms.
Where is the Threat?
The future threat in space, when it is discussed in military publications at all is described in only the most
general terms. The U.S. Space Command uses phrases like these to describe the threat. “In 2020, if not sooner,
adversaries will essentially share the high ground of space . . . The U.S. must be prepared to ensure our space
advantage over an enemy . . . It is inevitable that those bent on doing us harm will challenge us in space . . .
Our nation’s increasing dependence on space capabilities—both militarily and economically—produces a related
vulnerability that will not go unnoticed by adversaries.”2 All these statements may be true. The problem is an
inability to specifically define exactly when and where the threat will come.
John Pike of the Federation for American Scientists (FAS) has long been one of the most outspoken critics
of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and space weapons in general. His positions are well supported by numerous
members of the academic and scientific community and he is extremely well versed on these issues. In
discussing the future threat, Pike largely structures his criticisms on the lack of a specific defined threat.
Proponents of the need for space control weapons, according to Pike, “have had some difficulty pointing to just
precisely which satellites they would wish to attack. The canonical ‘rogue state’ threats—the Irans and Iraqs of
the world—currently lack space capabilities and are unlikely to develop worthwhile targets for many years to
come. Even Communist China, that has recently enjoyed something of a renaissance on the threat board, has
declined to deploy military space systems in any appreciable quantity. And Russia is too recently departed from
the enemies list to return to the baseline planning threat.”3
If these comments are true, a likely use of space by an enemy in the future might instead come from their
ability to take advantage of commercially or internationally available space assets, rather than from
indigenously developed systems. Why would a nation spend the billions of dollars necessary to develop a
satellite communication system when the services can be purchased from Iridium or another LEO supplier?
Why would a nation develop a separate navigation system when GPS is readily available and a world standard?
If the threat in the future is most likely to come from commercial satellites operated by international
consortiums, would the United States actually develop a robust weapon with the capability to destroy a
commercial satellite? What is the utility of an ASAT weapon against this kind of threat? Again, where is the
threat?
U.S. Space Command recognized this criticism in the development of their plans. They understood that
the United States would not likely face a peer competitor within the next two decades—but they also felt it was
inevitable the threat would arise. Space Command is also legitimately concerned about the vulnerability of
U.S. satellites.
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Effectively characterizing the future threat to U.S. satellites is difficult. General Myers talked about this
problem in an article in Aviation Week and Space Technology. According to General Myers, the current U.S.
intelligence system does not have sufficient capability to track the growing threat to U.S. satellites. U.S.
intelligence agencies used to keep close watch on Soviet ASAT technology, but the recent refocusing of
intelligence priorities has created a gap in tracking such information. Intelligence “has, over time, migrated to
other issues and it leaves us a little bit naked in knowing exactly what the threat is.”4
Interestingly, John Pike also recognizes the threat to U.S. satellites. After criticizing the lack of a specific
threat that would require the development of a U.S. ASAT weapon, he stated that an ASAT development might
actually make sense for an emerging power. He further asserted, “The sole remaining superpower presents an
extremely target rich environment of expensive and relatively fragile spacecraft upon which it has become
entirely dependent for the conduct of the full spectrum of military operations.” He also indicated that countries
like Iraq and China, rather than seeking to match U.S. military space systems, would more likely seek to
develop their own ASAT capabilities, providing them “an asymmetric response to the U.S. advantage in
space.” Pike further substantiates his argument by pointing out that Iraq, prior to the Gulf War, and China
today have reportedly engaged in the exploration of these kinds of capabilities.5
Critics and defenders of the military plans for space both agree that we are now in a period of “strategic
pause,” a time similar to the period between the two world wars. Some feel that if the United States makes the
correct decisions on an international basis, this pause, in space, could last indefinitely. Space Command, on the
other hand, feels that the military must take advantage of this pause, to explore new warfighting concepts and
develop new capabilities. Space Command’s Long Range Plan states the urgency of responding to this future,
complicated threat. “Given the continuing and dynamic nature of the space environment and the long lead times
necessary to develop and field space capability, there is a sense of urgency to articulate future requirements
today.”6
The recent space control technology program introduced by DOD is an example that critics point to in
addressing the lack of specific threats. The Program Budget Decision directing the program was developed in
response to criticism from Congress. It states in part, “the reluctance with which we have executed these
Congressional adds [space control programs] and our unwillingness to budget for space control have caused
several key members of Congress to ignore the Department and to turn to outside special interest groups for
ideas on how the Department should address the space control mission area.” According to John Pike, instead
of focusing on any real threat posed by enemy satellites, the new program was created to deal with a political
need to respond to Congress. “It’s totally divorced from any discussion of what the country actually needs,”
Pike said.7 The Pentagon is focusing on “things” not requirements. Again, where’s the threat?
How Are These New Systems and
Capabilities Going To Be Paid For?
In the statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter, General Horner was describing the enormous problems
facing the military in space today. He is not alone in his concerns. Senator Bob Smith (R-New Hampshire) and
other members of Congress share similar concerns. The Pentagon, the Air Force in particular, has defined future
requirements for space programs, but in the eyes of many is unwilling to budget for the resources necessary to
fund it.
The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board anticipated this criticism. Again, as quoted earlier from their final
report, failure to effectively support space “will send a clear message . . . that the Air Force is not serious about
taking a leadership role and becoming the aerospace force that the nation needs.”8 Almost simultaneously with
the release of this report, Senator Smith gave a speech at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy where he provided
very harsh (and nearly identical) criticism. In the speech, he presented a number of ideas about the future of
space, but he also severely criticized the Air Force and its support of space. In the audience were a number of
Air Force generals including General Richard Myers, current CINCSPACE. Senator Smith said:
In their rhetoric, both the Department of Defense and the Air Force have acknowledged the importance and
promise of spacepower. In his 1998 report to Congress, Secretary [of Defense] Cohen stated that “spacepower
has become as important to the nation as land, sea, and air power.” In 1995, the Air Force made clear in
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Global Engagement that: “The medium of space is one which cannot be ceded to our nation’s adversaries.
The Air Force must plan to prevail in the use of space.” . . . Compared to the magnitude of the technical
challenges involved—and these programs’ potential military value—the investments being made by the Air
Force in these areas are paltry.9
This criticism is based on Senator Smith’s perception of Air Force budget decisions on space over the last
five years. Senator Smith and other critics in Congress believe that the space threat in the future is growing and
they feel the Department of Defense should be responding accordingly. The Scientific Advisory Board report
explained, indirectly, the very reasons why this perception has developed. In the budget roll-up they proposed
for the future (Figure 8), they described the increased budget necessary for the Air Force to meet the needs of
the future. It also showed the actual Air Force space budget for the last five years. These data are shown in
Figure 9.
The chart shows that the actual Air Force expenditures on space have declined slightly or stayed fairly level
over the last five years. This is the data that Senator Smith refers to when criticizing the Air Force’s investment
in space. The senator believes that the Air Force has had ample opportunity to step up to the future for the last
five years and has failed to meet this obligation.
At the program level, the Air Force is also coming under fire for decisions made in early 1999 to delay
both the high and low portions of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the new missile warning satellite
programs. For a number of reasons (technical, programmatic, and funding), the Air Force decided to delay these
programs for about two years. This decision was seen by many in Congress as further failure by the Air Force
to support space. The publication Inside the Air Force reported that key members of Congress were “concerned
about the Air Force’s practice of using the SBIRS program . . . to pay its bills.”11 Senator John Warner (R-
Virginia), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called on Defense Secretary William Cohen to
cease making any changes to the SBIRS programs until Congress has an opportunity to decide on them.12
Senator Smith also weighed in. “We’ll hold hearings . . . I’m not going to stand by and let them cut programs
like [SBIRS],” he said. “If the Air Force is not interested in the space program, maybe another branch of service
is.”13
The Air Force, however, is in an almost impossible situation. The Air Force has to meet the threats and
obligations that face the military today. The Air Force has a fleet of aging aircraft that must be replaced.
Personnel shortages, particularly among pilots, have to be addressed now if the Air Force has any hope of
meeting mission requirements next year—making it hard to focus on problems that may be a decade or more
away. All the military services have plans and desires for preparing for the twenty-first century. Fiscal realities
are preventing these efforts from being fully pursued. In December 1998, responding to the speech by Senator
Smith, acting Air Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters said any reshuffling of priorities involving space would re-
quire the Air Force to shed large chunks of infrastructure because budgets are so tight.14 But Senator Smith had
already recognized this very fact, “Let’s not sugarcoat this,” he said, “this will mean shedding big chunks of
today’s Air Force to pay for tomorrow’s, and it will be very painful.”15
FIGURE 9. Air Force Space Budget for the Fiscal Years 1994 through 1998.10
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The Air Force knows that space is “sick.” The Air Force also knows it has to meet today’s missions.
General Horner expanded on the problem in an interview with the Air Force Times in February 1999—the same
interview from which the quote that opened this chapter was taken. He said, “The problem is not that the Air
Force ignores space. The crisis is one of money, and robbing the space budget to make up for drastic shortfalls
in the air budget.” He went on to say that although he agreed with many of Senator Smith’s criticisms, the
problem could not be solved without some drastic changes. The “sickness” of space in the Air Force, the way
the budget process currently works can only be made at the expense of air programs.16 In order to develop
systems to deal with the inevitable conflict in space, the Air Force would be forced to give up or alter plans for
systems needed to deal with the continuing inevitable conflicts on earth. Deciding which is more important is
difficult, if not impossible. As General Myers said in a speech in February of 1999, “We must energize space
funding at a national level. It’s more than we can do in the Air Force.”17
The Current Organization Cannot Effectively
Implement the Military Space Program
The current “organization” responsible for our nation’s military space program is very disjointed and has been
for decades. It is not actually a single organization, but a group of organizations each in charge of a different
piece of the puzzle. Different aspects of military space have been assigned to different organizations, originally
for very good reasons, but it creates confusion today and encourages criticism from a number of sectors.
The Air Force and others have long complained about this complicated organization, but with very little
effect. In 1992, the Air Force convened a Blue Ribbon Panel on Space with a charter to look at the entire
military space effort and submit recommendations to the Air Force leadership. The panel spent many hours
discussing the organizational problems of military space. In various discussions and in their reports, the
following were recurring themes.
Space responsibilities today are divided between the Services and DOD organizations. This fragmentation has
led to our space capabilities not being fully integrated and applied throughout our nation’s military forces.18
Multiple space acquisition organizations . . . have resulted in (1) fragmented responsibilities; (2) duplicate
facilities, staffs, and infrastructures; (3) deficiencies in achieving economies of scale, optimizing existing
capabilities, and focusing on validated operational requirements; and (4) less effective forces because
several organizations are developing space hardware that are not interoperable, thus complicating joint
military operations.19
Without DOD-wide reform, the Air Force could only implement change internally. In the Air Force alone,
different mission areas, as well as operators and acquirers had developed into very segmented communities
(stovepipes) that didn’t communicate or cooperate very well. Many of these Air Force problems have since been
addressed, but the problem of multiple agencies within DOD responsible for military space remains as
complicated as ever.
An incomplete list of the current organizations within the U.S. government currently responsible in some
way for military space reveals the following:
U.S. Space Command and the component commands of the Air Force, Navy, and Army
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Development and Engineering
Central Imagery Office (CIO)
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation
National Security Agency (NSA)
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
Numerous staff agencies in the Department of Defense and the Services
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This problem has not gone unrecognized at the highest levels of the administration, the DOD, Congress,
and other agencies as well. In 1992 the National Space Council, with direction from the Vice President
performed a comprehensive review of U.S. national space policy “in light of the (1) end of the Cold War, (2)
decline in defense spending and aerospace industry cutbacks, (3) impact of the federal budget deficits, (4)
revolution in space-related technologies, and (5) recognition that space has become a critical element in
America’s war-fighting capability.” Three major studies supported this effort: the Fink report on the future of
the U.S. space industrial base, the Aldridge report on the future of the U.S. space launch capability, and the
Wilkening report on U.S. space policy. The Wilkening report stated that “the four U.S. space sectors—military,
intelligence, civil, and commercial—each have there own institutional culture that encourages overlap and
discourages cooperation.” One of the major conclusions was the need for fundamental changes in the way
government space activities were organized and managed.20
In a January 1993 final report to President Bush on the U.S. space program, Vice President Quayle made a
series of space policy recommendations to assist the Clinton administration. One of the most critical was “the
need for strong White House focus to implement organizational changes to encourage greater cooperation and
synergism and less duplication among government space activities.” 21
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported on the same issues in 1994. They discussed the continuing
fragmentation of responsibilities among the many military space organizations. They criticized the DOD for
allowing the Air Force to have too large a share of the military space program. They felt that this was “not in
the best interest of the DOD’s diverse set of space users.” They criticized the administration for failing to make
the tough decisions to implement change. They called the effects of the organizational problem “a waste of
resources as well as detrimental to the effectiveness of joint war-fighting forces.” The GAO suggested that
“consolidating of space functions and centralizing management may be warranted.” They recommended
consolidating all military space acquisition under a single appropriation managed by a single organization and
they believed that merging the requirements and program management functions of the National Reconnaissance
Office into this single organization to be “a good idea.”22
Although some progress has been made in response to this myriad of recommendations, the situation today
has changed very little. U.S. efforts are still very segmented, and no single organization or individual is
responsible for all military space. Even the Commander in Chief of CINCSPACE does not have full
operational control of all space systems necessary for supporting military operations. During Senate testimony
in 1994, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) queried General Horner with the seemingly straightforward question,
“Are you in charge of space?” The only answer CINCSPACE could honestly provide was, “It depends.”23 The
situation for General Richard Myers, the current CINCSPACE, has not improved a great deal.
In the last few years, the Department of Defense has made some significant organizational changes to
improve the situation. In 1995, the DOD created the office of the DOD Space Architect. According to
Congressional testimony by Dr. Paul Kaminski, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, the DOD Space Architect was to be responsible for “developing an integrated defense space
architecture and coordinating with his or her counterpart in the intelligence community.”24 For the next two
years, the DOD Space Architect made some progress, publishing a DOD space roadmap, but again, DOD only
represented a part of the National Security Space Program. In 1998, the DOD Space Architect evolved into the
National Security Space Architect. This organization, for the first time, involved direct participation of both
DOD and NRO personnel. Dr. Kaminski felt that the inclusion of both organizations was critical for any real
success. He said in a 1997 speech that this new office promised to “help exploit the synergies and delete
potential redundancies within the planning between DOD and the Director for Central Intelligence. A far
superior complementary relationship is the goal of each organization. Closer integration has begun.”25
But significant organizational problems still remain. As discussed earlier, space is becoming a critical fuel
for the information age. The pace of change in the realm of information services and technologies is enormous.
Military success in the future requires domination of information—obtaining your own and denying it to the
enemy. But what is information dominance, what is information warfare, and who is responsible for
prosecuting these operations? Right now, the answer is everybody. Every service is developing bits and pieces
of information warfare capabilities and every command is developing their unique capabilities as well.
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Part of the problem is that information warfare is not, at this time, considered a separate mission area. It is
not conceived as “analogous to air, land, sea, and space warfare—that is, information as a ‘fifth dimension of
warfare.’ But just as the air, land, and sea dimensions have some unique weapons, so too will information
warfare.” An analysis by the Air Force Association urged that “organizational issues related to information
warfare be resolved quickly in order to exploit the technological opportunities—and avoid the military risks.
Given the expanding role of space-based assets to provide communications, an integrated Space and Information
Command would be a logical structure to protect those systems and to plan for offensive operations.”26 General
Myers, in talking about this very concept, has said, “There’s a lot of synergy between information operations
and space operations. By putting these two together, I think we can build a very powerful capability.”27
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) also see a lack of organization in dealing with information operations and
foresee a similar organizational change necessary to deal with this problem. In testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee in February 1999, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry H. Shelton,
described the JCS vision for the future (Joint Vision 2010) and how U.S. Forces expect to fight and win on
this battlefield. Information Warfare was a key component. He said, “we realize that we must have the
accompanying vision for how best to organize our forces to support the joint battle of the future. That
conceptual framework, which we call the Unified Command Plan 21, will be included as an annex to the 1999
Unified Command Plan recommendation. The Unified Command Plan 21 will lay out a flexible plan to
establish a joint forces command, a space and information command, and a joint task force to deal with the
complex issues here within the United States.”28 In terms of dealing with the information age and in terms of
dealing with the future of the military in space, the current organization cannot effectively or efficiently support
these critical needs.
Although DOD is moving in the right direction with Unified Command Plan 21 and the National Security
Space Architect, many in Congress don’t feel the change is happening fast enough. Led again by Senator Smith
from New Hampshire, many in Congress are proposing even more radical organizational changes to “fix the
problem.” In his criticism of the Air Force in particular, Senator Smith looked at the entire space organization
and found it lacking. He said, “as I look at the way it is organized, trained, and equipped, I do not see the Air
Force building the material, cultural, and organizational foundations of a service dedicated to space power.
Indeed, in some respects we are moving backward.”
Senator Smith’s vision of the future needs to be explained in more detail—to help provide insight into his
concerns, as well as the concerns of other members of Congress. In his November 1998 speech, he based his
remarks (on organization, funding, weapons, and the future) on three basic assertions: “first, America’s future
security and prosperity depend on our constant supremacy in space; second, while we are ahead of any potential
rival in exploiting space, we are not unchallenged, and our future dominance is by no means assured; and third,
to achieve true dominance we must combine expansive thinking with a sustained and substantial commitment
of resources, and vest them in a dedicated, politically powerful, independent advocate for space power.”
Although he encouraged more effort in the cooperation among U.S. civil, commercial, and military space, his
primary focus was on the organizational problems in military space.29
Senator Smith went on the say, “A better approach to explore might be to vest U.S. Space Command with
authority similar to that held by U.S. Special Operations Command—the Major Force Program or MFP
structure. MFP-11 gives CINCSOC [Commander in Chief U.S. Special Operations Command] substantial
control over development, acquisition, promotions and assignments in this unique mission area. U.S. Space
Command is perhaps the only institution within DOD that is developing both the theory and practical plans for
space power. But CINCSPACE needs the teeth and claws to compete for, and dispense, DOD resources. As a
conservative Republican, I am opposed to unnecessary bureaucracy. But space power is every bit as important
as special operations—perhaps, like special operations, space power should have its own MFP, and even its
own Assistant Secretary of Defense.”
The senator then went on to speak of an even more drastic step. “Ultimately—if the Air Force cannot or
will not embrace space power, and if the SOCOM model does not translate—we in Congress will have to
establish an entirely new service. This may sound dramatic . . ., but it is an increasingly real option. As I have
tried to convey, I want us to dominate space—and frankly, I am less concerned with which service does it than
I am committed to getting it done. My colleagues increasingly share this view. Creating a new military service
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to exploit a new medium is not unprecedented. Indeed, if any of our services should understand this point of
transition, it should be the Army Air Corps . . . I mean the Air Force.”30
There are many parallels between the experience of Army Air Corps aviators in their frustration between the
two world wars and the frustration of Space Command planners today in achieving the full military advantages
of a new medium. Both periods had a strategic pause necessary for such radical thinking and significant change.
In the face of an immediate threat, it is very difficult as well as dangerous for the military to make radical
changes in doctrine and force structure. Dr. James Tate in his book The Army and Its Air Corps discussed in
detail many of the frustrations of the air corps in implementing change. He talked not only of problems internal
to the Army, but significant inter-service rivalry with the Navy as well—issues also prevalent in the atmosphere
of today. He talked of the difficulty of fielding new capabilities in a time of declining defense budgets.
“Defense appropriations were cut in the 1920s and 1930s because planners felt the government could not afford
anything but a skeleton organization for the military, and also because few in the U.S., even the military, saw
any threat to national security.”31 These conditions are very similar to those of the 1990s. There are indeed
numerous parallels and many, including Senator Smith, are beginning to make this case.
According to General Horner, “The Air Force needs to take a step back and ask itself, ‘Are we like the
Army was in the 1920s?’ If we continue to hang onto space, are we going to smother it? The Army knew it was
time to let go of the Air Force in 1920, but we didn’t get a separate service until 27 years later. People are
reluctant to let go. Space is growing by leaps and bounds. It’s probably the fastest growing area in our military
arsenal. We have to ask ourselves if space stewardship would be better off as a separate space force. We
shouldn’t be afraid of that.”32
Criticism of the current military organization ranges all the way from problems with too many players, an
inability to properly plan for information age warfare, a failure of the Air Force to be proper stewards of
military space, to a potential need for a new military service to deal with space in the next century. Although
critics are varied in their approaches, they do tend to all agree that the current military plan for space cannot be
effectively implemented by the current military organization.
Space is Inherently Different from Air
Critics charge that combining space and air into a single medium, aerospace only confuses the issue. The U.S.
people do not look at space as anything like the air. An individual cannot choose to build a space ship in his
shop with his brother and fly off into space. He can build a rocket, but he can’t ride it, and obtaining orbital
velocity requires not only ingenuity, but also significant resources. The average citizen cannot yet purchase a
ticket to space. Space is still in the early stages of its development as a frontier, and that frontier is inherently
different from the frontier of the air.
John Pike provided the most detailed explanation of this criticism in a paper that he authored in November
of 1998 entitled American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium. His words summarize the views of
many scientists, scholars, and political figures.
Indeed, over time, it has become increasingly apparent that the fundamental premise of Aerospace Power
Doctrine, the unity of the air and space environment, is physically flawed. The operational conditions and
possibilities of air and space are radically different, and this difference finds concrete expression in the
physical configuration of air and space vehicles. Indeed, the most successful space vehicles, ranging from
the spherical Sputnik to the ungainly module that took Neil and Buzz to Tranquility Base, have been utterly
unlike aircraft. And those space vehicles that have appeared most like aircraft, such as the Space Shuttle,
have been among the most disappointing.
In recent years the debate over the Revolution in Military Affairs has given prominence to the widely abused
construct of Information Warfare, which has been taken to encompass a diversity of activities, some of
greater actual importance than others. Properly understood as the art of sustaining information superiority
over an adversary through dominant battlespace awareness, Information Warfare closely approximates many
of the distinguishing features of the contemporary American military advantage relative to others. This
dominant battlespace awareness is largely a product of military space systems and closely kindred
capabilities. Consequently, Information Warfare provides a rather more useful doctrinal point of departure
for conceptualizing military space operations than the tenets of Air Power. Recognition of this fact, however,
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would also provide an equally useful point of departure of the military space role from the Air Force into a
new separate Space Force.33
Pike basically makes the point that the Air Force has promulgated the doctrine of aerospace power only to
advance its position as the space force for America. Senator Smith is using a similar argument, as are other
members of Congress. What this argument fails to take into account is the similarity of missions between air
and space doctrine. Although the actual systems (satellites vs. airplanes) may be completely different, the
missions, in many cases, are very much alike. One of the first uses of air breathing platforms was to provide
intelligence and reconnaissance for military forces. The same can be said of space platforms. Air covers the
entire battlefield. Mastery of the air can allow a military complete access to any location on this battlefield.
Space has the potential to provide the same advantage on a global scale. If air supremacy provided the high
ground necessary for military victory, space supremacy can offer the same, or even a greater, advantage. This
doctrinal similarity is what causes the Air Force to combine air and space into a single medium—not because
of the physical similarities, but because of the mission similarities.
The Air Force leadership understands the physical differences of air and space, but believes the doctrinal
similarities demand they be treated as a single entity. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Ryan,
summed up the feelings of those who view aerospace as an inseparable domain in the following way: “There are
those who would want to separate the aerospace domain. But, that would be like separating the mountains from
the valleys or the oceans from the sea—it makes no sense militarily.”
Who will Implement the Vision?
In order to more efficiently operate and save money during times of tight budgets, the military is looking at
innovative ways to save money. One of these ways is through increased partnerships with industry and the
increased use of commercial capabilities for military purposes. These partnerships allow the military to
“outsource” or, more accurately, divest itself of missions that can more efficiently be done by the civil or
commercial sector. As General Myers has stated, “Divestiture is especially appropriate in the space business.
Because of its substantial impact on both the military and the economy and with the solid partnerships that
we’ve established between the two sectors, we often find the same players in the same room talking the same
systems. Understandably, the conversation can easily alternate between warfare and market share. When that
happens, those in uniform need to take a hard look at the issue and decide if it still fits into a military core
competency. If not, it’s a prime candidate for divesting.”34
The men and women in uniform have been paying close attention. In 1998, operation of the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was divested from the military and is now successfully being
operated by civilians of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with significant
savings to the country and the military. One of the most significant savings comes from the elimination of
more than 200 military space operators. Currently, the space launch ranges on the east and west coasts are prime
candidates for a similar divestiture. Many hundreds of military operators, although certainly not all, could be
eliminated with great savings and with no significant impact to the military’s access to space.
Significant savings are possible through the divestiture of these missions. It is in the national interest to
meet all military requirements in the most effective and efficient ways possible—particularly in the face of tight
budgets. This does create a problem, however. Without these hundreds of military space operators, it begs the
question, who will be trained and capable of operating the military space systems of the future? The systems
described in the military’s long range plan or the systems that clearly fall under the category of warfare? The
question of “who?” is being asked in many circles.
Senator Smith summed up these criticisms in his November 1998 speech. Among a number of criticisms
regarding management of military space personnel, the Senator chastised the Air Force for failing to take the
steps to build a “dedicated space warfare cadre of younger officers.”35 When you combine this observation with
the exodus of many young military space operators that has already occurred or is pending because of the policy
of divestiture, the concern is even more valid. How is the military going to build the large numbers of space
experts necessary to effectively operate the new vision of space for the twenty-first century?
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Space Should Remain a Sanctuary
The desire to keep space free from weapons has existed since the very beginnings of the space program. The
desire is not, however, as easily defined as one might think. Two schools of thought have attempted to define
the sanctuary concept, and they approach the problem from very different perspectives.
The first school can be referred to as the “traditional” school. It has basically remained unchanged since the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations first developed the U.S. national space policy. The policy says today,
as it has since the 1950s: “The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all
nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.”36 The traditional school believes that the
introduction of weapons into space will make this policy unachievable.
The second school looks at the preservation of a space sanctuary from a military perspective.37 In order to
understand this school, it is necessary to first differentiate between militarization and weaponization of space.
Space was militarized from the very beginning, according to this school. The ability of space systems, through
intelligence, reconnaissance, navigation, communications, and so forth to profoundly impact the outcome of
military operations on earth, forever “militarized’ space and made successful operations in this military medium
essential for a successful operation of a military operation on earth. Weaponization would be the introduction of
a “space weapon” either ground or space based, that could attack and negate other space systems or their ability
to support terrestrial operations.
The case made by this second school is that the United States currently dominates the military use of
space. Although other nations use space for military purposes, the United States is the most dependent of any
nation on this use of space. It is therefore in the best interests of the United States to maintain space as a
sanctuary, free from weapons, in order to preserve the capability of the United States to fully use military space
in the future. In other words, an enemy in possession of space weapons would provide more of a threat to U.S.
military forces than the threat created to enemy forces by U.S. weapons. It is therefore in the best interest of the
U.S. military to keep space free from weapons.
Although the two schools of sanctuary thought are based on different perspectives they both agree that the
current military long-range plans are not in the best interests of the United States. Any plans for space weapons
are not supported by either sanctuary philosophy. From a strictly philosophical perspective, this is the most
powerful argument effecting the current national debate.
All of these criticisms have powerful arguments and powerful proponents. Each must be taken into account
when determining the future course for the United States in space. However, these arguments, for the most part,
only deal with the military instrument of national power. The other instruments of power (specifically
economic and political) also have significant potential to impact the future of the nation.
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Chapter 8
Other Instruments of National Power
We pursue arms control because our citizens and military will be more secure if certain weapons are
eliminated or at least kept out of the wrong hands.
—Madeline Albright
U.S. Secretary of State1
We’ve got an agreement that bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. We think
that’s enough; we don’t anticipate any other problems.
—Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr.
U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament2
In a world of immense change, where technology advances and political alliances change seemingly overnight,
it is essential that a nation employ all of the instruments of national power in order to influence the world and
achieve its desired goals. The 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy stated that “we must be prepared and
willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state
actors.”3 The potential instruments of national power that can be applied include political, economic,
informational, as well as the military. The Pentagon, as discussed in the last two chapters, has developed plans
and concepts for applying the military instrument of power to dealing with future conflict in space. Even
though there are significant criticisms of these plans, the plans nevertheless address the problems of the next
century. Unfortunately, similar thought is not being applied in other areas.
Before proceeding with the details of U.S. efforts to apply the other instruments of national power, it is
necessary to briefly describe and define each of these instruments. During this discussion, a number of specific
tools that can be employed by a nation’s leadership will also be introduced.4
Political Instrument of National Power
The political instrument of national power is the execution of a nation’s foreign policy through diplomatic
means. Diplomacy arises out of the “fundamental character of the nation-state system, with its basic assumption
that nation-states are sovereign, but divergent in their interests and unequal in their power.”5 Diplomacy is
dependent on the power of persuasion, convincing others to take actions that allow for the successful
prosecution of a nation’s foreign policy. Rarely, if ever, is diplomacy successful without the strong support of
the other instruments of national power as well.
Diplomacy today is largely prosecuted in small, personal sessions out of the public spotlight. Although
large diplomatic bodies, like the United Nations, are successful in dealing with some areas of conflict, the vast
majority of diplomacy is conducted in smaller, bilateral negotiations. In a world where issues tend to be
complicated and multinational, it is easier to reach agreement with single parties. If two nations involved in
negotiations have very strong ties on a number of mutually beneficial subjects, it becomes easier to engage in
discussions on any subject.
In the United States, the State Department is the primary institution responsible for the execution of
diplomacy, although numerous other players, including the DOD, play critical roles. The State Department
employs all the nation’s official diplomats. They develop all treaties and international agreements on behalf of
the U.S. government—more than 14,000 since the end of World War II.6
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Economic Instrument of National Power
The economic instrument of power is the leveraging of a nation’s wealth to influence the behavior of others.
The more global the world’s economy becomes, the more important the use of economic power becomes—and
the more effective. Unlike the ideological conflicts that dominated the world throughout the entire 20th century,
economic concerns now tend to dominate decisions and priorities.
A nation can choose a variety of methods in applying economic power. Liberal or restrictive trade policies
can open up or deny markets to the other nations of the world. Lack of access to U.S. markets can be disastrous
for certain industries or countries, and many U.S. industries are viable only through access to international
markets. U.S. decisions concerning the changing of financial policy, which not long ago would have primarily
impacted the U.S., now impacts the entire world. The loosening or tightening of the U.S. money supply has
enormous worldwide implications. The United States has long used foreign aid to entice other nations into
taking actions favorable to U.S. interests and applied economic sanctions against enemies of the United States
in attempts to influence the behavior of “unfriendly” nations.
Historically, the effectiveness of the economic instrument of national power has not been very
good—particularly in cases of dealing with dictatorships or rogue states. In these cases, the withdrawal of
foreign aid or the application of economic sanctions often failed to impact the intended targets. A nation’s
population might have been impacted, but the leadership was left largely untouched. It is rare that a government
has actually changed its policy based on the application of economic power alone—but in combination with the
other instruments of national power, economics can be a very effective tool.
Informational Instrument of National Power
The informational tool of national power is the collection and denial of information about the world or an
adversary combined with the ability to disseminate this information. The role of the U.S. national intelligence
community is to gather valid and current information about potential adversaries and disseminate this
information to the appropriate decision makers. It is the responsibility of the decision makers to act on this
information. The United States also maintains an intensive security apparatus to protect critical information
from being obtained by these same adversaries. And finally, the use of “propaganda” vehicles like the Voice of
America and Radio Free Europe allows the United States to spread the message of democracy to people who
would otherwise be denied this information.
Until recent times, information has almost been an ancillary instrument of national power, augmenting
other efforts of the government. Now information itself is becoming critical for both economic growth and
military success in operations. The role of space as a fuel for the information age, and as a tool for providing
and controlling information, has already been thoroughly discussed. The role of the economic and political
instruments of national power has not been discussed yet and both have the ability to play an enormous role in
defining space in the next century.
The current U.S. National Space Policy talks about applying all the instruments of national power. In the
introduction it states, “For more than three decades, The United States has led the world in the exploration and
use of outer space. . . . We will maintain this leadership role by supporting a strong, stable and balanced
national space program that serves our goals in national security, foreign policy, economic growth,
environmental stewardship and scientific and technical excellence. Access to and use of space is central for
preserving peace and protecting U.S. national security as well as civil and commercial interests.” In his national
policy, the President has called for a balanced approach to dealing with the issues concerning the future
space—balanced in that it exercises all the instruments of national power.
In terms of political opportunities, in terms of diplomatic initiatives, the National Space Policy is short
and succinct in defining the overall effort.
The United States will consider and, as appropriate, formulate policy positions on arms control and related
measures governing activities in space, and will conclude agreements on such measures only if they are
equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the United States and our allies. The Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is the principal agency within the Federal government for arms
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control matters. ACDA, in coordination with the DOD, DCI, State, DOE, and other appropriate Federal
agencies, will identify arms control issues and opportunities related to space activities and examine
concepts for measures that support national security objectives.7
ACDA has recently been integrated into the State Department, placing responsibility for all international
arms control efforts under a single federal agency. All arms control initiatives and public diplomacy efforts are
now under the direct control of the Secretary of State.8 ACDA has, however, been preserved and is still
responsible for coordinating arms control activities within the State Department. In 1997, the ACDA annual
report, a full chapter was spent discussing the subject of negotiating and implementing arms control. In this
entire report, space is not mentioned in a single instance.9 It is possible that negotiations were taking place out
of the public eye, or that new initiatives have since been undertaken. However, the 1998 Arms Control Today
interview with Ambassador Grey clarified the U.S. position, that no negotiations on space were being
contemplated.
As U.S. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Grey is uniquely
positioned to understand the full spectrum of U.S. arms control initiatives. The CD is “the single, multilateral
arms control negotiating forum.”10 When questioned about U.S. opposition to the Chinese ambassador’s strong
call for establishing an ad hoc committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, he responded:
In our view, it’s not an issue that deserves a major share of the time and effort the CD has available for
negotiating arms control agreements. Outer space work is certainly not one of out priorities in the CD. There
is no arms race in outer space . . . . As long as there is no threat of an arms race in outer space it is far from
clear what the CD would gain by addressing it.
The interviewer then went further and queried, “If there is no arms race in outer space, wouldn’t it be in the
U.S. interest to negotiate a treaty that would freeze the status quo so there would be no possibility of an arms
race?” Ambassador Grey responded with the statement that opened this chapter, “We’ve got an agreement that
bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. We think that’s enough; we don’t
anticipate any other problems.”11
So, although the National Space Policy directs the consideration and formulation of arms control policies
regarding space, it is also clear, at the present time, that the current administration policy is that it is not
appropriate to be discussing political solutions to a problem that doesn’t exist. The current State Department
position is there is currently no “arms race in space” and no threat of such a race beginning.
With regards to the use of the economic instrument of power, the decade of the 1990s has been a period of
enormous opportunities and challenges for using economic policy with regards to space as an effective tool for
international cooperation. The National Space Policy clearly states that “the fundamental goal of U.S.
commercial space policy is to support and enhance U.S. economic competitiveness in space activities while
protecting national security and foreign policy interests.”12
In the early stages of the Clinton presidency, the administration implemented programs to allow U.S.
companies to aggressively pursue commercial and economic interests in the international space marketplace. In
1996, the administration established a strategic vision for the future of GPS with the goal of making GPS the
baseline navigation system worldwide. The administration also established general conditions and a detailed
review process to allow U.S. companies to compete in the growing business of providing remote sensing
(imagery) from space. This policy set up a process of licensing companies to operate private imagery satellites
and offer the products for sale. Technology for this capability had formerly been almost entirely controlled by
the government. As with most of the administration policies, economic growth was one of the highest
priorities.13
In 1998, after many years of effort, the Congress passed and the President signed into law the Commercial
Space Act. This act allowed for a number of improvements in government policy that would support the
development of commercial space in the United States. Among the initiatives were: allowing the use of residual
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as space launch vehicles; requiring the government, in the future, to
procure commercial sources for space transportation services rather than government operated systems;
encouraging the administration to take action to ensure that GPS continues to be the world navigation standard;
encouraging increased use of commercial products on the space station; and authorizing the transportation
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Department to license the re-entry of reusable space transportation systems.14 There were a number of issues that
were not included in the final legislation, concerning imagery for example, but the bill did provide improved
direction in many areas.
One of the most complicated issues for the administration has been that of export control. With the
explosion of commercial space in global markets, customers who just over a decade ago had no choice but to
turn to the United States for most space services, now have the opportunity to choose from a variety of
providers—the United States, Russia, the European Space Agency, international consortia, Japan, or China. If
U.S. companies were prohibited from competing because of fear of transferring critical technologies to potential
enemies, these customers would just go elsewhere. This is the dilemma; a need to allow U.S. companies to
compete fairly without allowing a loss of critical technologies.
A number of laws and policies govern how U.S. companies can compete in foreign markets with critical
technologies. The State Department, in coordination with other federal agencies, has historically assumed the
prime responsibility for controlling the transfer of military arms and technologies overseas. In the late 1980s,
International Traffic in Arms Regulations were the guiding policies for transfer of all arms, including satellites,
outside the United States. The 1989 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was entered into to prevent
the proliferation of missile technology around the world, and the 1991 Arms Export Control Act was passed
authorizing sanctions against any companies that allowed the transfer of critical technologies in violation of the
MTCR.15 The challenge continued to be to encourage U.S. commercial competitiveness while preventing
export of critical technology.
Just before President Clinton took office, the Bush administration made a decision to transfer the
responsibility for export control of purely commercial communications satellites from the State Department to
the Department of Commerce. However, if the satellite proposed for export included any of nine specific
technologies specifically identified as militarily critical, a license from the State Department was also required.
In 1996, the Clinton administration decided that this multiple approach for licensing was inefficient and slowed
down the process unnecessarily. Therefore, it was decided that all licenses for communications satellites would
be granted through one agency, the Department of Commerce, with other agencies coordinating on the process.
There was also one additional issue that further complicated economic policy concerning space—China. A law
implementing sanctions on China following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 requires the President to
issue a “national interest waiver” before any license may be issued for the export of a satellite to China. This is
in addition to the normal export licenses that must be obtained.16
Criticisms
Much in the way that plans for using the military instrument of power in space have been criticized, the efforts
regarding the use of the political and economic instruments of power have also come under heavy fire from
numerous sources. Criticism has come from both within the United States and from the international
community as well.
Criticism 1
Now is the time to negotiate treaties to keep space weapons-free, and the United States is the only country
unwilling to participate. Canada, one of the closest allies of the United States, has been one of the leading
critics in this area. In 1998, at the Conference on Disarmament, Canada proposed the following:
That a CD Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space be established with the mandate to negotiate a convention for
the non-weaponization of outer space. Under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, States Parties to the Treaty
undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any kinds of
weapons of mass destruction . . . or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. There is no
current multilateral agreement banning the deployment of weapons other than weapons of mass destruction
in outer space. There is thus a need for the international community to address this problem, and to do so
multilaterally, particularly in view of the growing number of states with the capacity or near-capacity to
place objects into orbit. We acknowledge that there is currently no arms race in outer space. We accept the
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current military uses of outer space for surveillance, intelligence gathering and communications. Our focus
is on the non-weaponization of outer space, i.e. no positioning of actual weapons in outer space.17
The United States blocked the formation of such a committee, but the Canadians have not been alone in
their desire to pursue the formation of such a committee in the pursuit of multilateral treaties. In 1995, the
Chinese government published a white paper on arms control and disarmament. In the paper, they clearly
stated, “China opposes the arms race in outer space.” They went further in discussing the history of their
opposition. Since 1984, the paper went on, China has time and again proposed to the United Nations and the
Conference on Disarmament resolutions to prevent an arms race in outer space. China maintains that outer space
“belongs to all mankind and should be used for peaceful purposes. No country should develop any kind of
weapon to be used in outer space: outer space should be kept “weapon free.”18
In August of 1998, H.E. Mr. Li Changhe, Ambassador of Disarmament Affairs of China gave a long,
impassioned speech to the plenary meeting of the CD entitled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.” In
the speech, he said there “seemed to be a view” that an arms race in outer space did not exist and therefore the
subject should not be a topic for the CD. He then said, “the Chinese delegation cannot agree with this
opinion.” He went on to explain how a series of activities in recent years concerning the development and plans
for testing of space weapons have given rise to concerns among countries all over the world. Facing such
efforts, it has become an actual and urgent issue to prevent an arms race in outer space.”19 A resolution to form
a committee during the 1999 session and pursue a treaty or treaties to prevent an arms race in outer space was
subsequently submitted to the United Nations by Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.20 The effort to form such a committee in the CD was again blocked
by the United States. Bilateral approaches have also been attempted. In 1997, as reported in the Washington
Times, Russian President Boris Yeltsin in a letter to President Clinton proposed a new round of U.S.–Russia
talks to prevent the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.21 Again, at least visibly, there has been no
U.S. response.
The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, also entered into the debate in statements to the
CD and the press in early 1999. He urged the CD to address the issue of outer space quickly because more than
30 countries already have space programs. “One concept which is now widely shared is that of maintaining
outer space as a weapons-free environment,” Annan said.22
Friends, allies, and potential adversaries have all attempted to engage the United States in negotiations to
preserve space for “peaceful purposes.” The United States continues to avoid the subject.
Criticism 2
Administration policy has damaged national security in pursuit of economic growth. Throughout the decade of
the 1990s, U.S. companies, seeking to take advantage of the booming space marketplace and encouraged by
both the Bush and Clinton administrations, moved boldly into foreign markets providing space services all
over the world. One of the most lucrative new markets was China.
In 1995, a Chinese Long March rocket exploded destroying a multimillion-dollar Hughes communications
satellite in the process. In 1996 a similar rocket explosion destroyed a multimillion-dollar Loral satellite. In
both cases Hughes and Loral engineers worked with the Chinese in their accident investigations hoping to
ensure that such expensive disasters could be avoided in the future. This assistance has created enormous
concern that it could have helped the Chinese improve their ballistic missile technology at the same time. It is
not clear, from open sources, exactly how much, if any, technology was actually transferred to the Chinese.
Congress began looking into the problem, but during that time, export licenses, with Tiananmen waivers,
continued to be approved allowing U.S. satellites to continue to be launched on Chinese rockets. In February
1998, the President approved a waiver that allowed Loral to proceed with another Chinese launch of a Loral
satellite despite numerous warnings about continuing Loral transfer of technology. Congressional criticism
became even more severe, and the House of Representatives formed a special panel to investigate the entire
matter. The administration cooperated with the investigation and in remarks at the White House about the
February 1998 waiver, President Clinton said, “I think the decision was a correct one . . . based on what I
thought was in the national interest and supportive of our national security.”23
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As part of the Strom Thurmond 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress passed legislation (in
October of 1998) to transfer jurisdiction for the licensing of satellites from the Commerce Department back to
the State Department. This was done “in light of concerns that recent exports of U.S. commercial
communications satellites for launch by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have damaged U.S.
national security.”24 President Clinton had threatened to veto this bill if it contained this direction, but in the
end he signed it into law, with reluctance. In a statement released at the signing of the bill in October of 1998,
he said:
I am strongly opposed to a provision that, effective March 1999, will transfer the jurisdiction over satellite
exports from the Department of Commerce to the Department of State. This change is not necessary to ensure
effective control of United States exports of satellites and could hamper the United States satellite industry.
The Congress repeatedly supported the transfer of the satellite licensing jurisdiction to the Department of
Commerce long before I ordered the transfer in 1996. I strongly urge the Congress to demonstrate its
support for a strong domestic satellite industry by passing remedial legislation to halt this transfer of
jurisdiction25
In December 1998, the special House committee investigating the incidents, reported that both Hughes and
Loral had damaged U.S. national security when they provided technical data that could have assisted the
Chinese in their ballistic missile program. The special committee, in a bipartisan 9–0 vote, agreed to endorse
the secret 700-page report and send it to both Congress and the Administration.26 The transfer of export powers
from Commerce back to State occurred in March of 1999 without the remedial legislation called for by the
President.
Criticism 3
Congress and the Administration are making it difficult for U.S. companies to compete in the global space
marketplace. Part of this criticism is the corollary to the previous criticism. Industry leaders are highly critical
of U.S. policies that restrict them from competing in overseas markets, including China. They make a good
case that if they are prevented from competing, other world industries, particularly Europe, will gladly take that
business, provide a very similar service as well as technology, and the only difference will have been the loss of
business by U.S. companies. The Electronic Industries Association, a trade group, summed up industry
concerns about the Chinese investigation and the Congressional report with the following comment, “If the
report takes steps to take export laws back to times like the Cold War, that’s a mistake.”27
In late February 1999, the White House announced that it was rejecting (for the first time) a license that
would have allowed Hughes to proceed with a $450 million satellite deal with China. The license was denied
for national security reasons. According to news reports, the Commerce Department had favored granting the
license, but both State and Defense had recommended against it. The Satellite Industry Association (SIA), the
lobbying group for the satellite industry, complained that the rejection of the license was for purely political
motives. The Chinese foreign ministry expressed “strong resentment” and issued a protest over the action.
Hughes hoped that the decision could be overturned.28 China continues to present strong challenges for both
economic and national security reasons, but this is not the only criticism of U.S. policy and limitations on
industry.
U.S. policy governing remote sensing continues to be an item of concern for industry. Currently the
United States now imposes numerous restrictions, particularly concerning resolution and timeliness, on U.S.
companies seeking to compete in providing overhead satellite imagery in the world marketplace. The United
States is concerned about two things: that potential enemies may be able to obtain intelligence damaging to the
United States, and concerns from foreign countries that the availability of such imagery could be obtained by
their enemies as well. Industry complains that this policy is not allowing them to compete with European and
Russian commercial efforts and has been lobbying hard to change the policy. The Commercial Space Act
passed in 1998 originally included provisions to relax these restrictions, but the rest of the legislation was
being held up because of disagreement over exactly what to do. Revising policy to allow U.S. industry to
better compete remains an unresolved issue.29
Commercial enterprises are also criticizing the current government efforts of providing and controlling the
imagery that does exist on the market. The House Science Committee heard testimony in late 1998 that
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criticized the government itself for providing unfair competition for private industries. “Industry continues to be
concerned that competition from both civil and national security agencies . . . remains the most pervasive and
unfair form of competition faced by the remote sensing community.” 30 Although the size of the remote sensing
market is the subject of enormous debate, there does appear to be a market for commercial imagery from
satellites—and the market seems to be growing rapidly. U.S. companies are concerned that unless they are
allowed to enter the marketplace now, they will be left behind.
Criticism 4
The government has no organizational structure capable of dealing with the myriad of space policy issues.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the National Space Council, under the direction of the Vice President,
developed U.S. space policy within the government. Upon taking office President Clinton disbanded the
council and placed these responsibilities under the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).
According to the National Space Policy, the NSTC is “the principal forum for resolving issues related to
national space policy.”
This decision has come under fire in a number of circles. James Hackett, former acting director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, stated in an editorial that when the decision was made to kill the White
House Space Council, it also killed the only mechanism the government had for coordinating government space
policy.31 But criticism of the current space policy structure has not only been limited to editorials. Individuals
from industry have also expressed similar frustration with the current organization. In late 1998 Dr. Robert
Butterworth of Aries Analytics Incorporated, testified before a joint hearing of the House Subcommittees on
Space and Aeronautics, Military Research and Development, and Military Procurement of the Committees on
Science and National Security. In discussing commercial space operations, he stated that the government’s
current organization made it very difficult to resolve problems. He blamed the abolition of the Space Council
and the placement of policy within the NSTC. According to Dr. Butterworth, “market developments have
outstripped this approach: space is no longer exclusively an issue of science and technology. An office focused
on those issues would not today be the natural venue for resolving questions about markets and security and
investment and operations. Rationalizing government with commercial activities, in other words, is more than
a process of acquisition reform. It requires strategic direction, the realignment of goals and resources—serious
organizational change.”32
The current governmental organization for dealing with space policy is as diverse and spread out as the
military organization described in the previous chapter. The State Department, the Commerce Department, the
NSTC, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the CIA, and many others all have roles to
play in determining how policy is developed and implemented regarding the future of space.
The future of space is enormously complicated and changing all the time. There are so many issues and so
many players, that it is difficult to determine a clear path to the future. There are, however, a number of steps
that can be taken that could allow for a clearer path.
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Chapter 9
An Integrated National Strategy
We are at the dawn of a new century. Now is the moment to be farsighted as we chart a path into the new
millennium.
President Bill Clinton
A National Security Strategy for a New Century1
With regards to the nation’s future in space, the United States currently lacks a long-term vision.
In the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration recognized the need for integrating all the aspects of
national policy in order to develop an effective space program. President Kennedy provided the overall vision
and direction as demonstrated by the words and deeds described earlier in this study. Senior officials in his
cabinet implemented the specifics of vision.
On 8 May 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and NASA administrator James Webb delivered a
memorandum to the President articulating both the need for and the specifics of a coherent national space
program integrating all the elements of national power.2 This national space program was clearly developed in
response to the activities of the Soviet Union and the overall strategy stayed quite consistent throughout the
Cold War. The space initiatives in the various segments of government—military, civil, and
commercial—varied greatly over these three decades, but their goals remained consistent. National security and
national prestige were the primary forces driving much of the space program. Numerous other forces impacted
the program, ranging from science to economics, but they were minor factors when compared to the focus on
national security, prestige, and relative standing with the Soviet Union.
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed this focus. Without a rival providing an immediate threat to the
United States, the need for an integrated space program lessened. The result has been the development of
separate military, civil, and commercial space programs driven by different priorities. The military space
program has continued to be driven by national security concerns. The civil space program, NASA, has focused
increasingly on science—on research and development. Exploration and discovery have again become the
primary forces behind NASA initiatives. Most significantly, the commercial space sector has been allowed to
flourish. Competition and profit are clearly the driving factors behind the commercial space industry.
The results of these separate programs have been positive in many ways. NASA has accomplished great
things when allowed to focus on streamlined discovery and exploration rather than operations orchestrated by a
massive government bureaucracy. The success of the commercial space sector has not been driven by
government direction, but by the enormous potential to generate income and make a profit. The military has
developed remarkable capabilities to support terrestrial operations by maintaining a clear focus on national
security. The problem is, however, that as each of these segments moved out into the future, they did so in
response to different visions—different directions. Without a threat like the Soviet Union, U.S. policy has
encouraged these different directions.
The 1996 National Space Policy provided very top-level guidance for each of the nation’s space
sectors—civil, commercial, and military. It did not fully integrate the nation’s space program and did not
provide a long-term vision for the future. Just over two years after its publication, it is already out of date. If
conflict in space were not inevitable, such an approach would be not only acceptable, but also appropriate.
These divergent approaches, however, make it difficult to deal with the inevitable conflict of the future.
The military is fully convinced that weapons will be needed to deal with this conflict. Other nations and
many within this nation see such a plan as disastrous and are calling for the United States to negotiate treaties,
bilateral and multilateral, to prevent this from taking place. Despite requests from numerous nations around the
world, new space treaties are not currently being considered. The administration has determined that the current
limits on placing weapons of mass destruction in space are all that is needed right now. The administration
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clearly sees a need for space control; however, it does not see the need for developing a full spectrum of
weapons that can influence space systems. Current national space policy is disjointed and confusing. Even on
the issue of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, the administration has sent mixed signals.
In the fall of 1997, the Clinton administration allowed the testing of the U.S. Army’s Mid-Infrared
Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) against an orbiting Air Force satellite. The objective of the test was as
follows; “to collect data that will help us improve computer models used in planning protection measures for
U.S. satellite systems.” The decision to test a high powered laser against an object in space was viewed by
many as an ASAT test. It came under heavy criticism from Russian President Yeltsin, many members of
Congress, and many in the scientific community as well—but the test was allowed to proceed. The satellite
was indeed illuminated by the laser.3 Almost at the same time President Clinton used the line item veto to
implement policy for the first time (an action since ruled unconstitutional) when he vetoed three programs with
the potential for exploring technology for space weapons—the Clementine II micro-satellite program, the
Army’s kinetic energy ASAT system, and the Military Space Plane. The administration explained that
MIRACL test was not an ASAT demonstration, that space control could be performed without weapons, and
that the three programs in question were not needed for our future defense. The resultant perception in the media
and in the world was that the administration did not have a clear policy for space control.4
In dealing with the commercial aspects of space, neither Congress nor the administration has been able to
clearly deal with the growth of the space business and its impact on national security. Even though the
Congress finally passed the Commercial Space Act in 1998, the critical issue of remote sensing (imagery) was
left unresolved. The true impact of global satellite communications from satellite constellations like Iridium
and Globalstar has not been fully addressed. Again, the commercial sector has a tremendous potential for
impacting national security—not only the U.S. sector, but the international as well. Every new step that is
taken into the frontier of space has tremendous impacts throughout society. Decisions regarding commercial,
civil, and military space systems cannot be effectively made without considering the full impact across the
sectors.
In looking at the current U.S. space strategy and policy, it is interesting to compare them with Chinese
efforts for planning their future in space. The Chinese have consistently pursued a balanced strategy that
effectively integrates all their instruments of national power. This coherent strategy has allowed them to
improve their ability to pursue their national interests while the United States seems to struggle with basic
questions of policy, vision, and the future.
As they have for many centuries now, through the rise and fall of different dynasties and now as the last
great communist power on earth, the Chinese have worked hard to strike a balance between peaceful solutions
and economic prosperity (wen) and the use of military power (wu). Development of the frontier of space for
China has been pursued by a combined application of these two basic principles. They realize that they remain
significantly behind the rest of the world, particularly the United States, when it comes to taking advantage of
space—for both military and commercial pursuits. They also realize that they must aggressively develop space
if they are going to be able to compete in the global information age of the next century. A world without any
threats to space systems would make their development efforts much easier. It would enable them to expand
their military and commercial space industry without having to worry about threats from other nations. They
would gladly give up any benefits they could achieve from future space weapons to be allowed to freely develop
the information potential of space (navigation, reconnaissance, communications, and so forth) They also realize
that they cannot afford to get into an arms race in space with the United States. Therefore, their diplomats have
been working aggressively in pursuit of treaties that would ban space weapons.
Mindful of more than a thousand years of history, China has also sought to avoid a total emphasis on wen
without wu. Therefore, the Chinese are apparently pursuing the development of advanced technology space
weapon systems. In late 1998 just after the Chinese ambassador had pleaded with the United Nations to begin
pursuit of treaties to prevent the weaponization of space, newspapers in Asia and the United States, citing
Pentagon and other sources, reported that China was developing a high power laser ASAT capability to allow
them to effectively conduct “information warfare.”5 China, in recent months has also been accused of obtaining
critical ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology from U.S. companies and from national laboratories. It
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is interesting to note that the Chinese government has vehemently denied the news reports accusing them of
spying, but has made no comments whatsoever on the reports of their laser ASAT development.
It seems clear that the Chinese are pursuing an integrated national strategy with regard to space that will
allow them to both expand economically and improve their own national security. Such a strategy is being
pursued within the constraints of their overall defense and economic programs. The United States, even with a
vastly superior economy and enormous resources, is not pursuing such a coherent approach. Should the United
States pursue and implement such a strategy? What would such a strategy look like? Does the future demand
such a strategy, or are the threats of conflict benign enough to allow for the continued development of space
based on divergent goals and direction?
The next century in space will be primarily driven by global economics. The military use of space will be
critical to the overall national security of the United States, but it will be a minority partner in the overall space
program. The civil space program will focus increasingly on science, and this science, for practical and political
reasons, will become even more international in scope. The global nature of the marketplace and international
partnerships in the future exploration and development of space will be the primary factors defining the
development of space over the coming decades. This creates a difficult problem for the Pentagon.
Earlier in this study, space was described as both a frontier and a fuel. Even though still early in its overall
development as a frontier, significant military and economic pressures are already beginning to generate
conflicts that require responses from the nations of the world. As a fuel, space is growing at an enormous rate,
helping to drive the information age, and has already reached a point where it can be described as a vital
national interest. These two analogies, frontier and fuel, provide useful insights into two different aspects of the
development of space, but they still fail to provide a comprehensive description of the environment of space
from a national and international perspective. Such a description is necessary in order to determine the need for
and the specifics of a coherent U.S. strategy for space.
The environment of space has reached the point where it can be referred to as a “commons.” Commons is
defined as an area that can be used by the community as a whole, or more specifically, as a legal term, an area
where one nation has the right to use the same area as another nation without interference.6 As a frontier, space
is a commons because it is available for exploration to any nation with the desire and wherewithal. As a fuel, it
is a commons because there are no national restrictions limiting how space can be exploited. The only
restrictions on space as both a frontier and a fuel are international in scope—applicable to the community of
nations as a whole, not any single nation. Therefore, areas of conflict, such as geo-stationary spacing or
spectrum allocations, must be dealt with from the viewpoint of the commons, as well as from the viewpoint of
individual nations.
The international nature of space, as a commons, is what makes the problem of dealing with conflict so
difficult. The military, as a minority player in space and in the absence of a coherent national strategy, is
finding it increasingly difficult to develop the means to deal with conflict in space in the next century.
Therefore, it is impossible for the military alone to effectively plan for and deal with all the elements of space
as it relates to national security. It is a national problem and must be dealt with in a coherent manner by the
executive branch—integrating all the elements of national power into a coherent policy.
As a commons, space will demand continued engagement in the international arena for the foreseeable
future. With regards to commercial and economic expansion, laws, treaties, and agreements must continue to be
explored and updated in order to allow for effective growth while minimizing conflict. The United Nation’s
ITU is perfectly positioned to deal with many of these multinational issues, through peaceful negotiations.
Similar to the commons of the sea, however, disagreements and conflicts will continue to occur whenever one
nation achieves a distinct advantage over others, and the others want to challenge this advantage. As the nations
of the world explored the sea, new international laws were developed, treaties among nations for fishing rights
and defense were established, and a new legal framework was developed to resolve conflict. However, these did
not always work, and nations had to be prepared to defend their rights to the seas with military power.
With regard to the commons of the sea, strategic military advantages and economic advantages are easily
discernable. Ships of war and ships of commerce are, for the most part, completely different. In space,
particularly in the future, satellites of war and satellites of commerce may be one and the same. The national
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response to a threat from a ship of war is clear. The national response to a satellite that has a military and
commercial “dual-use” is not so clear. The twenty-first century in space will be driven by dual-use technologies,
and these technologies will greatly impact future conflict. If the military desires to maintain an advantage in
space, the nation must pursue ways to effectively deal with these technologies. Again, the military cannot do it
alone.
The United Nations again offers opportunities to advance U.S. national interests in dealing with dual use
technologies. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and numerous other UN committees looking at commerce
and outer space are excellent forums for raising these issues among all nations. Possibilities exist for exploring
negotiated agreements for the controls of these kinds of systems and technologies. By engaging other nations
within the structure of the United Nations, progress is possible in at least defining some of the additional laws
and agreements necessary to operate in the commons of space.
The United Nations and other arenas for peaceful negotiations should not be looked at as a panacea. The
United States has the opportunity, because of its current competitive advantage, to continue to commercially
develop the commons of space and continue to be the primary provider for space services around the
world—from telecommunications, to navigation, to remote sensing, to whatever space industry arises in the
coming years. It is essential that the U.S. government not take any action or implement regulations that would
encourage other nations to develop a particular space market instead of U.S industry. This raises continuing
conflicts with national security interests and again stresses the need for an integrated approach from the U.S.
government.
With regard to national security, each nation, the United States included has certain national interests that
are unique to that nation in space. At the moment, the United States is probably the most heavily dependent
nation in the world on space. The United States must, therefore, be prepared to respond to threats to these
national interests if negotiations cannot achieve their objectives. Threats to these national interests in the next
century may come from a variety of sources. These sources could develop the capability to directly or indirectly
threaten U.S. space systems, develop the ability to deny commercial space capabilities to the United States,
develop indigenous space capabilities to threaten U.S. forces or citizens, or take advantage of international space
capabilities to provide their own strategic advantage. Each of these threats is significantly different, and each
must be considered by the nation in developing a strategy for the next century. Some threats may be effectively
controlled via political and economic means, others may require military intervention. Military intervention
may consist of non-lethal action (for example, jamming), lethal action confined to terrestrial targets, or
ultimately, lethal action against targets in space. A response to a purely commercial conflict would most likely
be handled through non-lethal means while the only time lethal space weapons would be required would be
when U.S. lives or property was threatened by space systems. There are numerous scenarios that may occur in
the future, and the United States needs to be prepared to respond to any of them. This is why it is critical that
the United States integrate all the elements of national power in developing a coherent, integrated strategy for
the future in space.
Conclusion and Recommendations:
The United States Critically needs an Integrated National Strategy for Space.
An integrated national strategy must be pursued that effectively addresses and integrates all the elements of
national power. Conflict in space is inevitable, and without an integrated national strategy, the United States
will not be able to make the most effective decisions necessary to fully take advantage of the future of space.
The United States is indeed in a unique position in history—a lone superpower with no aspirations for
further conquest and expansion. The lack of any immediate threat allows the country a period of “strategic
pause” in which the nation can take the time to develop not only the technologies, but also the policies that
will allow the nation to prosper in a period of relative security. Space is a critical element of the future. It will
play an essential role in allowing for economic growth and enhancing national security. In order to take full
advantage of this future, however, the United States must integrate all the elements of national power into an
effective, integrated national strategy. The following recommendations are specifically formulated to respond to
the complicated new environment of space in the twenty-first century.
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Recommendation 1
The Administration should reconstitute the National Space Council. The National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC) is “the principle forum” for resolving issues related to national space policy.7 Unfortunately,
very few of the critical decisions that need to be made regarding the future of space are issues of science and
technology. They are issues that cross the boundaries of many agencies in government and impact everything
from national security to economic prosperity. Addressing these issues in the context of science and technology
gives them the wrong focus. What has resulted is the development of disparate visions and plans (Commerce,
Defense, State, NASA, and so forth) for dealing with the future of space without an integrated assessment of
their impact on the other instruments of national power. Science and technology plans are integrated, but the
overall national policy is unclear.
What is clear is that the problem must be handled in the executive branch of government. Congress is
beginning to legislate different elements of the problem, but by its very nature, Congress will have a difficult
time attempting to integrate the different elements of foreign and economic policy that mostly lie within the
executive branch.
The original National Space Council effectively integrated the different elements of the executive branch
and allowed the development of coherent strategies. Having the council chaired by the Vice President gave it
the authority needed to make the tough decisions. Having a new National Space Council chaired by the Vice
President may be politically obsolete, but it would need to be chartered with the power and authority to make
critical policy recommendations to the President. It would have to include senior representatives from all the
impacted segments of the government—state, defense, commerce, CIA, NRO, NASA, the National Security
Council, to name but a few. Its first order of business should be to define the overarching space policy of the
nation that must contain a clear vision for the next century. This vision must be more than simply being
committed to “the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes.”
Recommendation 2
The United States develop and publish a new National Space Policy that clearly delineates a common vision
for the future of the nation in space. As stated earlier, the current National Space Policy is out of date. The
issues that need to be addressed are so complicated that only a national body within the executive branch, such
as a National Space Council, could possibly consolidate the various positions and integrate the policy. The new
policy must effectively encompass all the instruments of national power—allowing continued economic
expansion, pursuit of vigorous research and exploration, while at the same time protecting U.S. national
security.
The new National Space Council, if implemented, would still have a difficult time in developing a fully
coherent strategy without assistance. It is also recommended therefore that the council, as one of its first
actions, commission a study to be performed by a group of experts drawn from all the nation’s space
communities that would explore all pertinent issues and present recommendations that would form the basis of
a new vision and policy.
All of the instruments of national power must be effectively utilized and this requires new and specific
direction. The remainder of this chapter will identify some of the challenges that exist in each of the
instruments of national power and recommend broad guidance and direction needed to begin the development of
this new national policy. These remaining recommendations will first address the political aspects of the
problem, followed by the military, and finally the economic.
Recommendation 3
The new National Space Policy should declare space to be a vital national interest of the United States. For
numerous military and economic reasons, space is already a vital national interest of the United States.
However, failure to specifically declare it as such leaves doubt in the minds of both the world and U.S.
citizens, exactly how the United States would respond should U.S. interests in space be threatened. The
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declaration of space as a vital national interest would remove this doubt. It would also help to answer other
difficult questions that need to be addressed in the areas of commercial and national security policy.
Recommendation 4
The United States should enter into bilateral negotiations with other nations and multinational negotiations
within the United Nations concerning the broad issue of space in the future. This does not mean the United
States should immediately support or sign a blanket treaty to “preserve space for peaceful purposes” or
eliminate all future weapons in space. It is not clear whether this is in the best interest of the United States.
Other nations need to understand that the United States does not claim any sovereign right to space, rejects any
nation’s claim to such sovereignty, desires space be available for use by all humanity, but at the same time
considers the use of space to be a vital national interest of the United States—an interest the U.S. will be
willing to protect if called upon. The United States currently achieves such a tremendous strategic advantage
from the use of space, that signing such a treaty would effectively result in a unilateral decision to level the
playing field. The United States would not want to take this step unless other nations could ensure some
maintenance of the status quo (U.S. strategic advantage) into the future. Preserving this strategic advantage
should be a guiding principle behind any future U.S. initiatives.
Space has long been militarized, but in order to keep it from being weaponized, other nations would have
to give up some of their own potential to use space for military purposes. Other nations need to understand that
if they use space systems to target, exploit, or attack U.S. citizens or resources, these systems will be attacked
in return. Such a response could occur through an attack on the ground segment or the communication links,
but could if necessary, require the use of space weapons. A negotiating position for the United States could be:
if the world desires the United States not to develop space weapons, other nations must make concessions that
will allow for the status quo in the current use of military space systems to support terrestrial operations.
Without maintaining the status quo, U.S. military forces will become increasingly vulnerable around the globe
from the indirect military use of space systems. It is not clear whether other nations would desire to negotiate
based on these interests, but U.S. refusal to negotiate ignores the possibility for mutually beneficial, peaceful
solutions to conflict. The current administration’s foreign policy is based on a concept of international
engagement. By engaging around the world, it is often possible to find common ground and mutual interests
that can improve the situation for both (or many) countries. The same opportunity to engage is available in
space. The nation needs to take advantage of this opportunity.
Recommendation 5
The U.S. military must be prepared, across the spectrum of conflict, to take all prudent actions necessary to
achieve space superiority. Just as all operational plans today consist of military campaigns to achieve air
superiority, each of these plans must also include campaigns to achieve space superiority. Unless space
superiority is achieved, the nation’s political and military leaders need to be cognizant of the fact that U.S.
forces would operate under greater risk if committed into such a theater of operations. Space superiority plans
should consist of ground, air, and information attacks necessary to ensure the availability of space for U.S. and
allied forces and the denial of the use of space for enemy forces.
Space superiority, like that of air superiority or sea superiority, is not something that exists all the time.
Rather, it is something that must be achieved only when dealing with a specific conflict, and then must be
maintained for the duration of that conflict only. Space differs from air and sea superiority because of its unique
physical characteristics. In conflict, air and sea superiority can be achieved over the limited geographic area
involved in the conflict (for example, air superiority over the Persian Gulf, or sea superiority in the
Mediterranean Sea). Space presents a more complicated problem. Orbiting space systems have the potential to
impact an enormous portion of the globe, and therefore, space superiority must be evaluated from the
perspective of all of space, not just a limited theater of operations.
In its efforts to achieve space superiority, even for the limited duration of some future conflict, the United
States must, therefore, consider the overall impact of its actions on the overall commons of space. If the United
States impedes on the commons, establishing superiority for the duration of a conflict, part of the exit strategy
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for that conflict must be the return of space to a commons allowing all nations full access. This requires two
approaches: (1) the development of a complete spectrum of military options (non-lethal to lethal), and (2) the
development of doctrine and concepts of operation that will employ the military option least threatening to the
commons—thus allowing a better peace following the conflict.
Recommendation 6
The United States should begin an aggressive development and test program for a spectrum of capabilities
necessary for space control. As history has demonstrated, a concentration on political means without the proper
preparation to use military force will almost certainly result in failure. It should therefore be the goal of the
United States to aggressively pursue development and test programs for space weapons that will allow future
decision makers options to deny, disrupt, degrade, and, if necessary, destroy space systems that could threaten
U.S. interests in the next century. Space superiority can, at least for some time, be achieved without  the use of
space weapons. There is currently no specific threat demanding the deployment of such weapons. Therefore, the
United States need not make a decision on the need to deploy such weapons at this time. It is possible that
through negotiations, peaceful solutions to future threats may be achieved. It is also possible that through the
use of terrestrial and air-breathing forces, space superiority can be achieved well into the future. The future threat
in space may be handled in a progressive pattern of response that focuses on denial and disruption without
having to degrade or destroy. However, at some time in the future, if peaceful negotiations fail, and military
planners cannot develop terrestrial means to ensure space superiority, the only alternative may be the
deployment of some types of space weapons. If this scenario occurs, the United States must be prepared to
respond.
A full spectrum of capabilities is needed to allow decision makers options for resolving conflict at the
lowest level possible. The only way to be fully prepared is to have fully developed and tested the critical
systems and technologies necessary to field such capabilities.
Failure to fully develop and test such capabilities and such weapons could make the United States
vulnerable to surprises from other nations in the future. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, former commander of the
U.S. Space Command said, on many occasions, that when it came to space weapons the one thing the United
States couldn’t afford to be was second.8
A robust program developing capabilities for space control should be laid out to explore new technologies,
integrate them into new weapons systems, and fully test them both in laboratory and field demonstrations.
Since the goal would be not to deploy such weapons until absolutely required (and when that time would come
is unknown), an urgent “crash” program is not needed. However, unless aggressive programs (in terms of
funding and schedules) are developed, little progress will be made. In this time of strategic pause, programs can
be implemented that are aggressive, but take the necessary time—time to fully explore different technologies
and thoroughly test and check out systems when developed. If the systems actually reach maturity, and there is
still no pressing need for deployment, they can be set aside until such a situation arises.
At the same time, the military needs to more fully develop the doctrine necessary to operate and use space
control capabilities. The concept of space superiority is still relatively new for military planners. Significant
work still needs to be done on how to effectively and efficiently achieve space superiority for today’s military.
Otherwise, when and if the day arrives where space weapons are needed, the transition will be confused at best.
Understanding concepts and doctrine will allow military leaders to give political leaders sound advice on how
to achieve space control as well as when space weapons need to be deployed and used.
The same approach should be applied for the development and use of space weapons for missions other
than space control—specifically missile defense and force application. Again, when a threat emerges in the
world that cannot be handled through either peaceful means or with traditional military methods, and a space
weapon can handle such a threat, the time will have arrived to deploy such weapons.
Methods for better characterizing potential attacks and defending current space assets also need to be
pursued. Improved space surveillance capabilities are needed to ensure better knowledge of future activities in
space. Improvements are needed on future satellites to better indicate when and if they are being jammed or
attacked. An anomalous event on a satellite can be caused by many reasons: the impact of the space
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environment, system anomalies on board the spacecraft, or by the intentional efforts of an enemy.
Distinguishing between these events is difficult, but the correct response depends on knowing the specific
cause. Satellites today have a poor capability to identify these causes, and this capability needs to be improved
to better identify problems and conflict.
The deployment of space weapons should be treated as a last resort by this nation—but not as an
unthinkable option. United States policy has long been to believe in the concept of employing force only as a
last resort, but U.S. presidents have used military force when the situation demanded. The same should be true
of space weapons. The United States should make every effort, political and otherwise, to create a future in
space where weapons are not required. The deployment of such weapons will create the need on the part of
future enemies to attempt to respond in some way to such a step—and how they respond is difficult to predict.
It would be better to control the future through peaceful agreements that are in the mutual interests of all parties
involved. At the same time, the United States should be prepared to deal with conflict in space if these other
means fail. This means developing and testing a broad spectrum of space weapons.
Recommendation 7
The Department of Defense should create a new organization responsible for all military operations dealing
with space and information. The current U.S. Space Command organization is fundamentally flawed—and the
current proposal from Unified Command Plan 21 for a U.S. Space and Information Command doesn’t go far
enough. The current organization fails to take full advantage of the unique attributes of either space or
information. Responsibilities for military space operations are spread out through numerous government
agencies and the responsibilities for information are just as confusing. The future in space and information will
only become more complicated. Now is the time to take action to consolidate responsibilities for these areas
into a single organization.
Unified Command Plan 21 (UCP 21) takes a step in the right direction, but until the Commander in Chief
of the U.S. Space and Information Command can sit in front of Congress with the responsibility for all space
and information operations related to national security, the organization will be flawed. The critical concept of
unity of command is necessary for effective and efficient military operations—one mission, one commander.
The new U.S. Space and Information Command must therefore assume responsibility for all national security
space and information operations—including many of the current functions of the current U.S. Space
Command, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and so forth The
focus of the new command should be on operations, not on acquisition or development. This organization
could begin to develop and understand its unique missions while they are still in their early stages. Many
organizational difficulties (for example, the role of the CIA and numerous agencies currently involved in
information warfare) block an immediate transition. The current Space Command organization is also not
conducive to such drastic change. The reorganization proposed in the UCP might be a good first step, as long
as a longer-term goal of more drastic change is clear. The sooner a more complete change can be implemented,
the better the nation’s security will be in the long run.
Recommendation 8
The military services, particularly the Air Force, must continue to meet the responsibilities for funding the
military space program. A separate service to execute current space missions is not required. The three services
today (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are in the process of effectively integrating space into their warfighting
capabilities. Looking toward the future, space doctrine is indeed a natural progression from Air Force doctrine,
and the Air Force is the logical organization to lead the effort in further development of these concepts and
ideas. A robust Space and Information Command would solve many of the organizational problems by
assuming operational control of all national space and information systems. The military services should retain
the responsibility to organize, train, and equip these forces.
However, the perception that the services have not fully supported the development of space during the last
few years is real and must be addressed. Faced with severe budget pressures the services have all sacrificed
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future space programs to help pay other critical funding requirements. Congress has taken note and has been
severely critical.
Delaying the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the highest priority military space program, for two
years is viewed by space proponents as a decision equivalent to the Army delaying deployment of the M-1 tank
because the M-60 could last a couple more years; or the Air Force delaying the development of the F-22 fighter
because the F-15 could last a couple more years; or the Navy delaying their newest carrier because their oldest
could last a couple more years. It is not just about how long a system lasts, but the need to update out-of-date
technology and take advantage of new capabilities. Failure to treat space systems with equal importance to other
military programs sends the wrong message.
The Air Force needs to support SBIRS as one of its highest priorities—as important to the Air Force as
the F-22. The other services need to support further development of space as well—at the expense of their own
infrastructure if necessary.
There may be a day in the future when the United States determines a need to deploy space weapons. At
that time, warfare will be conducted in the actual medium of space, and there may be a need for a separate space
service. That would be a logical point to make such a decision. Making that decision now would be a mistake.
Space does not currently require such oversight and nurturing—if the Air Force and the other services can meet
the actual and perceived need to be good stewards of military space. If the current military services fail to step
up to this challenge, a decision for a space service could result well before its time and well before many of the
critical policy and doctrine questions have even be addressed.
Recommendation 9
The United States should structure its laws and regulations governing the commercial use of space to ensure
U.S. companies remain or become the leaders in the global marketplace. All space industries are global in
nature. Navigation, weather, imagery, communications—all were developed in the United States. The U.S.
space industry, once a free world monopoly, now faces increasing competition from around the world.
Complicating matters even further, every one of these commercial developments inherently has significant
military capability within it. Commercial navigation, commercial weather, commercial imagery, and
commercial communications can all be used to help a potential enemy close the gap with the information
dominant United States.
Any action that the U.S. government takes that prevents U.S. companies from competing in international
markets is a threat to national security. If U.S. companies are the leaders of the industry, and the world comes
to them for a particular space service, the United States as a nation at least maintains some insight and control
over this service in times of conflict or crisis.
At the same time, any action that U.S. companies take to transfer critical technologies overseas is also a
threat to national security. Even if the technology is “only” for communications satellites, that technology still
advances the state of the art overseas and allows international companies to provide improved capabilities in
competition with the United States.
In a global economy, however, it is impossible for a nation to isolate itself and still be able to compete.
The United States must trade overseas with space services, and therefore, industry must be allowed some
leeway in the exchange of technical information.
In March 1999, the State Department, in order to comply with the 1999 National Defense Authorization
Act, assumed responsibility for satellite export controls. However, according to John Holum, acting
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Affairs, they are having extreme difficulty in staffing
this critical function. Shortly after assuming responsibility for this function, he stated, “Congress mandated
new staff . . . but there wasn’t any money provided for that.”9 International customers responded negatively. In
its 5 April 1999 issue, Space News reported that “three large satellite operators from Canada, Europe, and Asia
said new U.S. technology-transfer regulations will make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for them to
purchase U.S. satellites.”10 It was clearly implied that these operators, previous U.S. customers, would go to
other international markets to obtain these services.
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Given these sets of circumstances, the national space policy should direct the following: remove
restrictions that prevent U.S. industry from maintaining a leadership role in the space marketplace, enter into
agreements with industry to allow some control over international services in times of international crises, and
allow industry to enter into export agreements when it can be demonstrated that no threat to national security
will be created. The state department is the best place to coordinate these export licenses. A new joint agency
group under the state department should be fully funded and designated responsible for processing these
licenses in a much more expeditious manner. The United States cannot afford to miss out on international
opportunities because of government bureaucracies. If these actions can be implemented, the issues concerning
difficult and controversial subjects like remote sensing and imagery resolution should be easier to resolve, and
the United States should be able to capture the majority of the space business in the twenty-first century—good
for business, good for national security.
The United States has an amazing opportunity to implement a vision that will help shape the world in the
twenty-first century. Space is only one of many places where this opportunity presents itself, but space is
unique in many ways. Space envelops the earth and reaches to the stars. Space has the ability to effect, in some
way, every person’s life on this planet. Without a peer competitor, the United States has the opportunity now
to take advantage of the unique attributes of space, but the nation has not yet stepped up to the challenge.
Conflict in space is inevitable. No frontier exploited or occupied by humans has ever been free from
conflict, but the United States now has a remarkable chance to mold and shape how these conflicts will be
resolved in the future.
There is no threat right now that demands the deployment of space weapons. Opportunities exist in the
Conference on Disarmament and through bilateral negotiations to make progress in eliminating the future need
for such weapons. At the same time the United States cannot afford to be caught off guard in the future—the
nation cannot afford to be second in the deployment of space weapons. The only way to ensure this happens is
through a robust development program for an entire spectrum of space control capabilities—deferring the
decision to deploy space weapons until a clear requirement exists.
If the United States remains strong, if space is a clear vital national interest, if we negotiate openly with
the nations of the world, if we allow our industry to fully exploit space and become the unquestioned leader of
the information age, and if we develop the means and methods to effectively deal with the inevitable conflicts
that will occur in space in the next century, perhaps President Kennedy’s new ocean could remain primarily a
“sea of peace.”
If, however, the United States continues without an integrated national strategy, if we fail to define a
vision of space for the future, if we decide to develop space weapons in a vacuum apart from the rest of the
space community, if we refuse to negotiate with other nations, or if we fail to fully establish a comprehensive
commercial space policy, then the ocean will undoubtedly become “a terrifying new theater of war.”
The opportunity exists now, but it won’t last forever. It requires a vision, and it requires decisions. It
requires a national debate on the issues. It requires a desire to eliminate space weapons in the future, while at
the same time developing the very same weapons. It requires an understanding that, if a threat does appear in
the future, the United States may very well have to deploy these weapons. It requires an understanding of a
wide variety of very complex issues, but most importantly, it requires an integrated national strategy.
In his first annual address to Congress, the first state of the union address, President George Washington
addressed Congress about its most important duties. The date was 8 January 1790 and President Washington
said:
Fellow Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives . . . . Among the many interesting objects, which
will engage your attention, that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be
prepared for War is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.11
In the 209 years since these remarks were spoken, little has changed. If the United States desires to preserve
peace in space in the next century, the nation must be prepared for war. Such preparations do not demand the
deployment of space weapons, but they do demand their development. In order to fully exploit the tremendous
riches and opportunities in space, the United States must be willing to effectively combine all the instruments
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of national power in a concerted effort toward the realization of a future vision. If the nation prepares now, the
vision has no limits. If we fail to prepare, that vision will be defined by others—and not likely in a way the
United States would prefer.
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